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Abstract
The last several years have seen a dramatic increase in the amount of time and money consumers spend online.
As a consequence, the Internet has become an important channel that firms can use to reach out and connect
to consumers which has lead to the emergence of online advertising.Given the scale and novelty of online
advertising, there is a growing need to understand how consumers respond to online ads and how firms
should advertise using this medium. In my dissertation, I study different aspects of sponsored search and
display ads which constitute the bulk of online advertising. In the first essay, I focus on the issues related to the
use of aggregate data in sponsored search. I demonstrate that models commonly used in sponsored search
research suffer from aggregation bias and present the implications of this aggregation bias. In the second essay,
I focus on the advertiser's problem of bidding optimally in sponsored search auctions. In the third essay, I
study the interactions between various forms of online advertising like banner ads, display ads and sponsored
search ads and address the problem of attribution.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON ONLINE ADVERTISING
Vibhanshu Abhishek
Kartik Hosanagar
Peter S. Fader
In this dissertation, we study dierent dimensions of online advertising by focusing on re-
search questions which are motivated by marketing and managerial considerations. The rst
essay highlights the inadequacies of data standards that are commonly used in sponsored
search. We show that these datasets result in aggregation bias and propose alternate data
standards that do not suer from this bias. An equilibrium analysis is performed to analyze
the eect of this bias on the search engine and advertisers and it is shown that the search
engine tend to lose the most from this bias. The second essay focuses on an advertiser's
problem of bidding optimally in sponsored search. Uncertainty in the decision-making envi-
ronment, budget constraints and the presence of a large portfolio of keywords makes the bid
optimization problem non-trivial. We formulate this problem mathematically and propose
a \myopic" policy for one-period optimization. This policy is extended by incorporating
interactions between keywords, in the form of positive spillovers from generic keywords into
branded keywords. This multi-period \forward-looking" policy uses a Nerlove-Arrow model
to capture the long-term interactions between these keywords. The spillovers are estimated
using a dynamic linear model and used to jointly optimize the bids of the keywords using
an approximate dynamic programming approach. In the third essay we discuss the prob-
lem of attribution in the context of online ads. We formulate a dynamic Hidden Markov
Model to capture a consumer's behavior during the purchase process and how this process
is aected by ads. This model is subsequently used to evaluate the role that each ad plays
in a consumer's eventual conversion in order to solve the attribution problem.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
CHAPTER 1 : Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CHAPTER 2 : Aggregation Bias in Sponsored Search Data: The Curse and The Cure 6
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 Aggregation Bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4 Empirical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.5 Managerial Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.6 Suggested Cures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
CHAPTER 3 : Optimal Bidding in Multi-Item Multi-Slot Sponsored Search Auctions 51
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.2 Literature review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.3 Analytical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.4 Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.5 Empirical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.6 Incorporating Interdependence between Keywords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.8 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
vii
CHAPTER 4 : The Long Road to Online Conversion: A Model of Multi-Touch At-
tribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.2 Prior Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.3 Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.4 Model of Multi-Touch Attribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.5 Empirical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
viii
LIST OF TABLES
TABLE 1 : Sample dataset for a particular keyword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
TABLE 2 : Complete dataset for a particular keyword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
TABLE 3 : Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
TABLE 4 : Estimates of Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
TABLE 5 : Comparative performance of various data summarization approaches. 34
TABLE 6 : Predictors of Bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
TABLE 7 : Summary of notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
TABLE 8 : Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
TABLE 9 : Product Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
TABLE 10 : Summary for the three groups of keywords. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
TABLE 11 : Summary Statistics for the Random Bidding Period . . . . . . . . . 69
TABLE 12 : Parameter estimates for a sample subset of keywords. . . . . . . . . 73
TABLE 13 : Parameter estimates for a sample subset of keywords. . . . . . . . . 75
TABLE 14 : Changes in keyword performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
TABLE 15 : Estimated Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
TABLE 16 : Bids under the forward-looking policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
TABLE 17 : MAE between the predicted and observed moments . . . . . . . . . 97
TABLE 18 : Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
TABLE 19 : Predictive validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
TABLE 20 : Estimates of the transition parameters () . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
TABLE 21 : Estimate of factors aecting the page views () . . . . . . . . . . . 121
TABLE 22 : Estimates of conversion parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
TABLE 23 : Conversion probability as a result of various factors. . . . . . . . . 123
TABLE 24 : A comparison of attribution methodologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
ix
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
FIGURE 1 : Logistic regression on complete and aggregate data. . . . . . . . . 15
FIGURE 2 : Mean Intra-day Variation in Position. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
FIGURE 3 : HB Estimation on complete and aggregate data. The red dotted
lines represent the mean of the respective coecients' distribution. 27
FIGURE 4 : Error distribution estimated by computing the dierence between
the estimates from aggregate data and complete data. . . . . . . . 27
FIGURE 5 : Optimal bids computed by maximizing Equation (??) for dierent
estimates of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
FIGURE 6 : Loss in revenues caused due to Aggregation bias. . . . . . . . . . . 31
FIGURE 7 : Loss in search-engine revenue caused due to Aggregation bias. . . 32
FIGURE 8 : Illustration of the Timeline for the various data collection periods. 68
FIGURE 9 : Distribution of estimated parameters across keywords. . . . . . . . 74
FIGURE 10 : Interaction between search activity and latent awareness. . . . . . 81
FIGURE 11 : hN (b)=gN (b) v/s b assuming the competitors bids are Weibull( =
1:59;  = 1:37;  = 1:42). The ratio hN (b)=gN (b) decreases as N
increases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
FIGURE 12 : 	(b) for various distributions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
FIGURE 13 : Multiple ad exposures across dierent online channels. . . . . . . 100
FIGURE 14 : Diagram representing the latent states and the outcomes of the
HMM. qss0 denote the transition probabilities from state s to state
s0 and Ys is the binary random variable that captures conversion
in state s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
x
CHAPTER 1 : Introduction
The last several years have seen a dramatic increase in the amount of time and money
consumers spend online. A recent survey reports that consumers spend around 33% of
their time online (IAB 2011). As a consequence, the Internet has become an important
channel that rms can use to reach out and connect to consumers which has lead to the
emergence of online advertising. Several forms of online advertising has evolved over the
year, e.g. sponsored search, display advertising, email marketing, classieds and more
recently social network advertising, sponsored search and display advertising dominating
the online marketing landscape. Internet advertising has become a signicant component
of advertisers' marketing mix. Firms spent close to US$ 35 Billion on online advertising
in the year 2011 and this expense is expected to double in the next 5 years. The online
advertising spend surpassed the amount spent on newspaper advertising in the year 2010
and is expected to surpass television advertising by the year 2016.
There are several factors that have contributed to this growth in online advertising { (i)
measurability, (ii) scale and (iii) targetability. Firstly, it has been extremely dicult to
quantify the returns from traditional advertising. Online advertising on the other hand is
highly measurable, with search engines and ad networks tracking every action of consumers.
This unprecedented amount of data has helped advertisersne tune their campaigns and
increasing their returns from online advertising. Secondly, a huge amount of trac ows
through channels like search engines and with the ever increasing time consumers spend on
the Internet, the ad inventory available online is signicantly more than one could imagine
in a traditional medium like television or print. Thirdly, with development of technologies
like geolocation and persistent cookies, it is very easy to track and target customers at a
level of granularity which was impossible to imagine in traditional advertising.
Online advertising has lead to some fundamental changes in the eld of advertising. Tra-
ditional advertising was the forte of large rms with large advertising budgets. Due to
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the incremental costs of online advertising, e.g. per-click or per-impression, advertising
expenses can be nely controlled at a daily level. For the rst time small and medium sized
local rms can directly reach consumers through online advertising. The ne level of con-
trol has not only made advertising more ecient but might also lead to an increase in the
amount spent on advertising, most of this growth fueled by smaller local rms. In addition,
traditional advertising has primarily been push-based where ads are shown to consumers
when they are engaged in some unrelated activity like reading or watching television. New
innovations in advertising like sponsored search are primarily pull-based { they show ads
to consumers when they are looking for something and since these ads are contextually
relevant, consumers have a higher probability of engaging with these ads. The eectiveness
of sponsored search vis-a-vis other channels has been fairly well documented (Ghose and
Yang, 2009, Goldfarb and Tucker, 2010, Agarwal et. al., 2011). From an academic per-
spective online advertising presents very granular, individual level data which has eluded
researchers and marketeers in traditional advertising, allowing them to gain a better insight
into consumer behavior.
Given the scale and novelty of online advertising, there is a growing need to understand
how consumers respond to online ads and how rms should advertise using this medium.
In my dissertation, I study dierent aspects of sponsored search and display ads which
constitute the bulk of online advertising. In the rst essay, I focus on the issues related to
the use of aggregate data in sponsored search. I demonstrate that models commonly used
in sponsored search research suer from aggregation bias and present the implications of
this aggregation bias. In the second essay, I focus on the advertiser's problem of bidding
optimally in sponsored search auctions. In the third essay, I study the interactions between
various forms of online advertising like banner ads, display ads and sponsored search ads
and address the problem of attribution. A detailed description of these essays is presented
below.
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Essay 1: Aggregation Bias in Sponsored Search Data - Existence and Implications
There has been signicant recent interest in studying consumer behavior in sponsored search
advertising (SSA). Researchers have typically used daily data from search engines containing
measures such as average bid, average ad position, total impressions, clicks and cost for
each keyword in the advertiser's campaign. A variety of random utility models have been
estimated using such data and the results have helped researchers explore the factors that
drive consumer click and conversion propensities. However, virtually every analysis of this
kind has ignored the intra-day variation in ad position. We show that estimating random
utility models on aggregated (daily) data without accounting for this variation will lead to
systematically biased estimates { specically, the impact of ad position on click-through rate
(CTR) is attenuated and the predicted CTR is higher than the actual CTR. We demonstrate
the existence of the bias analytically. These ndings are empirically validated using a large
dataset from a major search engine. We show the eect of the bias on the equilibrium
of the SSA auction. Search engines are always aected adversely due to aggregation bias.
In addition, we show that advertisers receive a higher payo from SSA when they all use
complete data. Finally, we empirically quantify the losses suered by the search engine
and an advertiser using aggregate data. The search engine loses over 17% of its revenues
on average. We also observe that an advertiser could unilaterally increase his revenues by
around 6% if he used disaggregate data.
Essay 2: Optimal Bidding in Multi-Item Multi-Slot Sponsored Search Auctions
We study optimal bidding strategies for advertisers in sponsored search auctions. In general,
these auctions are run as variants of second-price auctions but have been shown to be incen-
tive incompatible. Thus, advertisers have to be strategic about bidding. Uncertainty in the
decision-making environment, budget constraints and the presence of a large portfolio of
keywords makes the bid optimization problem non-trivial. We present an analytical model
to compute the optimal bids for keywords in an advertiser's portfolio. To validate our ap-
proach, we estimate the parameters of the model using data from an advertiser's sponsored
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search campaign and use the bids proposed by the model in a eld experiment. The results
of the eld implementation show that the proposed bidding technique is very eective in
practice and leads to a 75.38% increase in the advertiser's prots. We extend our model to
account for interactions between keywords, in the form of positive spillovers from generic
keywords into branded keywords. We use a Nerlove-Arrow model to capture the eect of
generic click and impressions on awareness and the subsequent spillovers into branded search
activity. The spillovers are estimated using a dynamic linear model framework and used
to jointly optimize the bids of the keywords using an approximate dynamic programming
approach. This policy is slightly better than the policy that ignores interactions between
keywords. It leads to an overall increase of 83.25% in the advertiser's prots.
Essay 3: The Long Road to Online Conversion: A Model of Multi-Touch Attribution
Consumers are exposed to advertisers across a number of channels. For example, a consumer
may be exposed to an advertiser's display ads at multiple websites followed by sponsored
search ads for a number of queries. So a conversion or a sale may be the result of a series of
ads that were displayed to the consumer. This raises the key question of attribution: which
ads get credit for a conversion and how much credit do each of these ads get? The issue
has received considerable attention in the industry. Although the issue is well documented,
current solutions are often simplistic. For example, a common practice is to attribute the
sale to the most recent ad exposure. In some instances, rms apply exponentially decreas-
ing weights based on time of ad exposure. These methods of attribution penalize prior
exposures and give undue credit to ad exposures that occur just before the sale. As all
the ads collectively inuence the consumer's decision to make a purchase, it is dicult to
disentangle the contribution of various ads towards the eventual sale. The problem of attri-
bution is exacerbated because dierent entities manage dierent components of advertising
like sponsored search and display advertising which has impeded development of a unied
attribution frame work. In this paper, we address the problem of attribution using a unique
data-set from a digital ad agency that managed the entire online campaign during a car
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launch. We present a Hidden Markov Model of an individual consumer's behavior based
on the concept of a conversion funnel that captures the consumer's deliberation process.
We observe that dierent ad formats, e.g. display and search ads, aect the consumers
dierently and in dierent states of their decision process. Display ads usually have an
early impact on the consumer, moving him from a state of dormancy to a state where he
is aware of the product and it might enter his consideration set. However, when the con-
sumer actively interacts with these ads (e.g. by clicking on them), his likelihood to convert
considerably increases. Secondly, we present an attribution scheme based on the proposed
model that assigns credit to an ad based on the incremental impact it has the consumer's
probability to convert.
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CHAPTER 2 : Aggregation Bias in Sponsored Search Data: The Curse and The
Cure
2.1. Introduction
Sponsored search advertising (SSA) has not only transformed the way companies conduct
their marketing activities, but it has also been a tremendous resource to academic re-
searchers who seek to better understand how consumers respond to such ads. A myriad of
researchers have turned to SSA data to uncover new insights about consumer search (Ghose
and Yang, 2009; Rutz and Bucklin, 2011), choice and related purchasing behaviors (Jeziorski
and Segal, 2009; Yang and Ghose, 2010; Agarwal et al., 2011) and advertiser/search engine
strategies (Animesh et al., 2009; Yao and Mela, 2011; Rutz et al., 2012). Many of these
papers have used random utility models to study the eect of ad position, keyword length,
presence or absence of brand name, etc. on the click-through and conversion rates of the
ads.
Sponsored search refer to ads that are displayed alongside organic search results when a
user issues a query at a search engine. The advertisers submit bids for keywords that are
relevant to them, along with these ads.1 When a user enters a query, the search engine
identies the advertisers bidding on keywords closely related to the query and uses data on
bids and ad quality/performance to rank order the ads in a list of sponsored results. The
most widely used pricing model is the pay-per-click model, in which the advertiser pays only
when a user clicks on his ad. The advertiser's cost per click or CPC is determined using a
generalized second price auction (GSP), i.e. whenever a user clicks on an ad at a particular
position, the advertiser pays an amount equal to the minimum bid needed to secure that
position.
Although SSA is a relatively new practice, it already has fairly well-established data stan-
dards associated with it. Most researchers who have modeled SSA-related issues have
1The term keyword refers to term or phrase on which an advertiser bids. Query (or query term) is the
search phrase entered by the consumer when conducting the search
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worked with a data structure such as the one illustrated in Table 1. Advertisers also obtain
Table 1: Sample dataset for a particular keyword
date impressions clicks avg. pos avg. bid avg. CPC
01/11/09 180 1 19.33 1.00 0.30
01/12/09 202 0 18.42 1.00 0.00
01/13/09 212 0 17.12 1.00 0.00
01/14/09 223 5 8.19 2.00 1.24
01/15/09 166 4 7.59 2.00 1.03
01/16/09 198 3 7.94 2.00 0.89
01/17/09 197 5 8.08 2.00 1.21
01/18/09 321 21 2.00 3.00 2.12
similar datasets from search engines and analyze them to design their bidding policies. In
almost all cases, these data are aggregated to the daily level and contain summary statistics
for the day, such as the number of ad impressions, average position of the ad, number of
clicks received and the average CPC. It should be clear how this kind of dataset lends itself
to the types of models mentioned above, as well as analysis of a variety of other customer
behaviors (and related rm actions). But despite the creativity and methodological prowess
that has been demonstrated in this growing body of literature, we believe that these mod-
eling eorts are plagued by a major problem: an aggregation bias due to the way that the
raw (search-by-search) data are \rolled" up into Table 1.
In practice, the position of an ad can vary substantially within a day and aggregated data fail
to capture this variation. It is also widely known that the impact of position on CTR is non-
linear. For example, an ad at the topmost position tends to receive a disproportionately
large number of clicks as compared to the other positions. The convexity in the CTR,
coupled with the intra-day variation in position suggests that the daily aggregation might
lead to estimation bias. The goal of this paper is to provide a thorough evaluation of the
nature of this bias and to demonstrate its eects.
The paper makes the following contributions. Firstly, we show that applying logistic model
to aggregated SSA data can lead to biased estimation of the parameters of a random utility
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model. Due to the bias, the eect of position on CTR is attenuated and the predicted
CTR is higher than the actual CTR. Secondly, we study the changes in the equilibrium of
the SSA auction induced by the bias. Since the advertisers use aggregate data to arrive
at incorrect estimates of the ctr-position curve, one would assume that they are negatively
aected by this bias. Surprisingly, if all the advertisers use aggregate data, the consequence
of the bias is completely borne by the search engine. Thirdly, using a large disaggregate
dataset from a major search engine, we quantify the magnitude of the bias and measure
its economic impact. We extend the Hierarchical Bayesian (HB) model using a latent
instrumental variable (LIV) approach to address the issue of position endogeneity which is
common in sponsored search. We nd that the search engine loses over 17% of its revenue on
average due to the aggregation bias. Our ndings raise serious concerns for SSA researchers
and practitioners and also question the adequacy of the data standards that have become
common in SSA. Finally, we present some data summarization techniques that can reduce
or eliminate the bias.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related work and positions
our work in the literature. In Section 3, we analytically prove the existence of the bias and
build a game-theoretic model to study the economic impact of the bias. In Section 4 we
analyze a large disaggregate dataset from a search engine using the HB-LIV model. We
present the managerial implications of the bias in Section 5. Then we present various data
summarization techniques in Section 6 and nally discuss the implications of the bias on
research and practice and conclude the study in Section 7.
2.2. Related work
There has been a considerable amount of work on auction design and consumer choice
models in SSA (Weber and Zheng, 2007; Liu and Whinston, 2007; Hao et al., 2009; Goldfarb
and Tucker, 2007). More specically, there are two streams of work that are closely related
to our study, namely empirical research on consumer click and conversion behavior in SSA
and work related to aggregation biases in choice models.
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Empirical Research in Sponsored Search
There has been a lot of recent interest in trying to understand the factors driving keyword
performance in SSA. Craswell et al. (2008) and Ali and Scarr (2007) propose individual
keyword-level models to study how consumers navigate sponsored links. Other researchers
have used logit models to measure the inuence of factors like ad position and keyword
characteristics on the consumer behavior in SSA (Rutz et al., 2012; Rutz and Bucklin, 2011;
Ghose and Yang, 2009; Agarwal et al., 2011). Rutz et al. (2012) compare the performance
of several logit models in predicting the conversions for various keywords. Their results
show that keywords are heterogeneous in their conversion rate and a signicant portion of
this variation can be explained by the presence of brand or geographical information in the
keyword. In another paper, Rutz and Bucklin (2011) measure the spill-over eect of generic
keywords on branded keywords. Ghose and Yang (2009) use a random eect logit model
to understand the relationship between dierent metrics such as CTR, conversion rates,
bid prices and ad position using the advertiser's aggregate data. They show that keywords
containing retailer information have a higher CTR whereas keywords that are more specic
or contain brand information have a lower CTR. Recent work by Agarwal et al. (2011) uses
a logit model to show that although the CTR decreases with position, the conversion rate
is non-monotonic in position. They point out that the topmost position is not necessarily
the revenue maximizing position.
Most of this stream of research uses aggregate data to estimate the parameters of the
model. The aggregate data obfuscate the variation in ad position and research in this
area has overlooked this fact. Ignoring this variation can lead to potential biases in the
estimation of parameters and ultimately aect the conclusions from these studies.
Aggregation Bias
Though researchers have grappled with the issue of data aggregation for many years, there
is no clear consensus on this issue. The problems associated with aggregation have been
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commonly encountered in spatial and demographic studies and are referred to as the Yule-
Simpson eect (Good and Mittal, 1987). The drawbacks of aggregation have also been
pointed out in various studies in the economics and marketing literature. Neslin and Shoe-
maker (1989) point out the limitations of aggregate data by refuting the claim that sales
promotions undermine the consumer's repeat-purchase propensity. They show that even if
the individual purchase propensities do not change before and after promotions, statistical
aggregation would lead to lower average repeat probabilities for post promotional purchases.
Yatchew and Griliches (1985) discuss the implications of aggregation in the context of probit
models. Issues related to data aggregation in the case of logit models have been presented
by Kelejian (1995). He discusses why aggregation bias might occur when logit models are
estimated on aggregate data and proposes a test for the existence of this bias.
On the other hand, several researchers believe that the eect of aggregation is negligible or
absent when the disaggregate model can be approximated by the aggregate model (Gupta
et al., 1996; Russell and Kamakura, 1994). Using household-level panel data and store-level
purchase data, Gupta et al. (1996) show that the price elasticity estimated from the two
models dier by a very small amount (4.7%). Allenby and Rossi (1991) present an analytical
proof for the non-existence of aggregation bias in nested logit models of consumer choice
when the products are close substitutes of each other, though they assume that the micro-
level consumer behavior is approximately linear in the product attributes.
The discussion reveals two themes. First, a number of recent studies have applied the
logit model on aggregated SSA data to study consumer choice behavior. Second, although
aggregation bias has been shown to exist in a number of environments, its non-existence
has also been demonstrated in several other environments. It is not clear which of these
arguments is most applicable in the SSA context, and it is thus not clear whether and to
what extent aggregation bias aects SSA research. This paper uses a theoretical model to
show why data aggregation might lead to biased estimates in the SSA context. An extensive
disaggregate search engine dataset is used to empirically measure the extent of aggregation
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bias in SSA research which we believe has been done for the rst time. Finally, we discuss
the economic consequences of aggregation bias.
2.3. Aggregation Bias
In this section we explore the estimation bias due to the aggregation of SSA data. We
begin by pointing out the distinction between the complete (disaggregate) and the summary
(aggregate) data that have been referred to in the paper. Table 2 is a stylized example that
presents impression level data for an ad, reecting every search query for a particular term.
Each observation contains the date on which the impression occurred, position of the ad,
bid placed by the advertiser, whether the consumer clicked on the ad and nally the CPC.
Search engines usually do not provide such granular data to advertisers or researchers.
They provide aggregated data at the daily level as shown in Table 1 earlier that mask the
intra-day variation in position.
The intra-day variation arises due to two major factors { Firstly, SSA auctions are extremely
dynamic with advertisers entering and exiting the auction or changing their bids contin-
uously. Change in the competitors' behavior lead to a change in ad position. Secondly,
most of the ads, specically broad match and phrase match ads are shown for a number
of dierent queries.2 As the set of competitors can be dierent for dierent queries, the
position of the ad also varies across queries.
2.3.1. Analytical Proof of Aggregation Bias
Logit utility model
The logit utility model has been extensively used in economics and marketing to explain
consumer choice behavior. Researchers have primarily focused on keyword-level models
to analyze the eect that factors like ad position, specicity of the keyword, presence of
2An exact match occurs when the users query term exactly matches the advertisers keyword. A phrase
match occurs when the advertisers keyword appears anywhere within the users query. Finally, a broad
match occurs when user query is determined to be broadly similar to advertisers keyword. Broad match is
commonly used by advertisers as it maximizes the number of ad impressions.
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Table 2: Complete dataset for a particular keyword
impression date click pos bid CPC
1 01/11/09 0 16 1 0.00
2 01/11/09 0 20 1 0.00
3 01/11/09 0 18 1 0.00
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8190 02/15/09 0 6 2 0.00
8191 02/15/09 0 5 2 0.00
8195 02/15/09 0 6 2 0.00
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9145 02/23/09 1 1 3 2.31
brand name and other variables have on the consumer's propensity to click on the ad. The
consumer's utility has been modeled as
U = X 0 + ; (2.1)
where X is a vector of covariates,  is consumer sensitivity to these attributes and  
Logistic(0; 1). In binary choice models, this utility is not observed but constitutes a latent
variable. The consumer clicks on an ad when U > 0, i.e.
Yi =
8><>: 1 i U > 0;0 otherwise,
where Y is a variable that denotes whether a click was made or not. In accordance with prior
research, we build a keyword-level model that ignores other ad characteristics and focuses
our attention on the impact of ad position on click through rate, i.e. U = f(position). The
simple model allows us to clearly identify the existence and direction of the bias. However,
this assumption does not impose any restrictions on the model as all keyword characteristics
(which do not change during the day) are subsumed in the intercept term and the we focus
our attention on position which varies intra-day. Although we focus on a keyword level
model in this paper, our nding are applicable for dierent levels of analysis.
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Estimation using complete dataset
We now discuss the estimation of  when the model is estimated using the complete dataset.
Let Vi be a random variable denoting the ad position on the i
th impression. We assume that
Vi is independent and identically distributed and has a distribution given by FV (:) which
is assumed to be constant during the period of observation. The consumer's utility is given
by the following expression
Ui = 0 + 1Vi + i: (2.2)
As i is extreme value distributed, the probability of clicking on an ad (CTR) is pi =
1=(1 + exp f0 + 1vig). Note that pi might vary across impressions as the ad position is
varying as well. Let ^c denote the maximum likelihood estimate from the complete dataset.
It can be shown that ^c satises the following equation
3
obsctr =
1
I
IX
i=1
expf^0;c + ^1;cvig
1 + expf^0;c + ^1;cvig
: (2.3)
where obsctr, the observed click-through rate, is the fraction of the impressions that result
in a click and it equals C=I, where C is the total number of clicks from I ad impressions in
the entire dataset. vi is the realization of Vi for a particular ad impression. An important
property of ^c is as follows.
Lemma 1 ^c is a consistent and unbiased estimator of .
Estimation using aggregate dataset
Researchers do not observe Vi when aggregate data are used. They only observe the mean
daily position W which is given by
W =
V1 + V2 + : : :+ VN
N
; (2.4)
3Derivations of all equations appear in the Online Appendix.
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where N is the random number of ad impressions on a particular day and V1; : : : ; VN is the
ad position during each of those impressions. The distribution ofW is FW (:) and it depends
on the distribution of V and N . If the eect of position is estimated from aggregate data,
the consumer utility from clicking the ad is eectively modeled as
Ud = 0 + 1Wd + d; (2.5)
where Wd is the average position for the day and d is the logistically distributed error
term. This formulation causes a mis-specication as the consumers do not observe the
ad at a position Wd but at position V . As the variable Z = V   Wd (E[ZjW ] = 0),
which aects the consumer's click behavior, is not accounted for in the regression, the
mis-specication is similar to omitted variables bias pointed out by Yatchew and Griliches
(1985) and Wooldridge (2001). However, this issue arises primarily due to data aggregation
and our approach is closely related to prior work in Marketing by Christen et al. (1997),
Steenkamp et al. (2005) and Gupta et al. (1996). Further, as V ar(Z) is not constant (it
depends on the number of impressions in a days), the ndings of Yatchew and Griliches
(1985) and Wooldridge (2001) are not directly applicable in this context. Hence, we derive
an important relationship between W and V in order to prove the aggregation bias.
Lemma 2 W is less than V in convex order.4
W cx V (2.6)
This relationship between W and V is very general and holds for any distribution, FV (:).
Let the number of impressions on day d be denoted by nd and the number of clicks by cd;PD
d=1 nd = I and
PD
d=1 cd = C. The maximum likelihood estimate from summary data,
4X is less than Y in convex order if E[f(X)]  E[f(Y )] for all real convex functions f such that the
expectation exists. All proofs appear in the Appendix.
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^s, satises the following equation,
obsctr =
1
I
DX
d=1
nd expf0;s + 1;swdg
1 + expf0;s + 1;swdg (2.7)
Using Lemma 2 and the preceding result, we prove an important result of this paper.
Proposition 1 ^s is a biased estimator of .
If ^c is equal to ^s then the convex order between W and V implies that
E
"
expf^0;c + ^1;cV g
1 + expf^0;c + ^1;cV g
#
> E
"
expf^0;s + ^1;sWg
1 + expf^0;s + ^1;sWg
#
:
As both the L.H.S. and the R.H.S. equal obsctr (as shown in Appendix A), this inequality
is incorrect and hence ^c cannot equal ^s. Since ^c is a consistent and unbiased estimator
of , ^s is biased. This nding is contrary to earlier work by Allenby and Rossi (1991),
Gupta et al. (1996) and Russell and Kamakura (1994) which prove that aggregation bias
in market or store-level scanner data is negligible. Aggregation bias is signicantly reduced
in these models as products are very close substitutes of each other and the consumers (or
house-holds) are exposed to very similar marketing activities. However, position has a very
strong eect in sponsored search (Craswell et al., 2008) and ads in dierent positions are
perceived very dierently by consumers. Coupled with variation in ad position, aggregation
bias can be quite substantial in sponsored search, a hypothesis we test in Section 4.
0 5 10 15
0.
00
0.
10
0.
20
pos
ct
r
− estimated on aggregate
estimated on complete
Figure 1: Logistic regression on complete and aggregate data.
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Due to the convexity of the CTR-position curve and the variation in position, the mean daily
CTR at every position lies above the true CTR (see Figure 1).The relationship between the
estimated and the actual CTR is presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The direction of aggregation bias is such that (i) the CTR estimated from
the summary data is greater than or equal to the actual CTR at any position, and (ii)
^1;s > ^1;c.
^s is biased and it predicts a CTR that is higher than the actual CTR at any position.
Incorrect estimation of CTR might lead advertisers to make suboptimal choices in sponsored
search auctions. The second part of Proposition 3 is consistent with Wooldridge (2001)
which shows that the estimates are scaled towards zero.
The omitted variable Z has the eect of increasing the disturbance term in the regression.
The estimated error can be computed as a convolution of  and Z, but this is analytically
intractable as  is logistically distributed. If Z and  can be approximated closely by a
normal distribution, the asymptotic behavior of ^s is as follows:
^1;s
p! 1q
1 + V ar(V )
2=3
; (2.8)
where  = E[1=N ] and is bounded by (1 (1 e ))=    (1 [1 F(1)+3(1 F(2))=m])
where  = E[N ]. When there are a large number of daily impressions, i.e. !1, ! 1.
Equation 2.8 shows that, if the variation in the the intra-day position is known, the actual
1 can be approximated by multiplying ^1;s by the scaling factor. However, this approach
suers from several simplifying assumptions that are required for analytical tractability. In
Section 5, we provide more general and robust empirical methods to remove the bias.
2.3.2. Eect on Equilibrium Behavior
As advertisers use estimates from historical data to bid in SSA auctions, incorrect estimation
of the CTR might have a negative impact on the advertiser and search-engine prots. In
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this section, we analyze how the impact of the bias is shared between the advertisers and
the search engine and who is aected more by aggregation.
For our analysis, we make the following assumptions { (i) there are K advertising slots
and K + 1 advertisers, (ii) the advertisers' valuation for a click, sk are drawn from a
continuous distribution with support on [0;1), (iii) advertisers know their own valuation
and the distribution of bids and nally, (iv) the click-through rate i decreases with the
position i. In addition, we also assume that advertisers estimate i from historical data
and are unaware of the aggregation bias. The advertisers are indexed in decreasing order
of their valuations, i.e. s1 > s2 > : : : sK+1 and their bids are b1; : : : ; bK+1, respectively.
5
In addition, h = (bi; : : : ; bK+1) refers to the history of bids prior to assignment of position
i.6 The case where complete data are used is analyzed rst. Here the advertisers correctly
estimate i. Edelman et al. (2007) show that under the above assumptions, there exists
a unique envy-free perfect Bayesian equilibrium and the optimal strategy for advertiser k
under this equilibrium is to bid as follows,
bk(sk; i; h) = sk   i
i 1
(sk   bi+1): (2.9)
This is the maximum CPC that the advertiser is willing to pay to move to position i   1
and receive more clicks. At this point, Advertiser k is indierent between getting position
i   1 at a CPC of bk(sk; i; h) and position i at bi+1. This is an ex-post equilibrium, i.e., it
is optimal for Advertiser k to follow the equilibrium strategy for any realization of other
advertisers' valuations. The search-engine revenue is CS =
PK
i=1 ibi+1 and the payos
for advertiser i is Ci = i(si   bi+1). It should be noted that this equilibrium ensures an
assortive match, i.e., if si > sj then advertiser i bids higher than advertiser j and occupies
a slot above advertiser j in equilibrium. This case serves as a reference for the ensuing
discussion.
5bK+1 is set to 0.
6Positions K through i+ 1 are assignment before bidding for position i starts.
17
Next, we consider the case in which aggregate data are used. Let the CTR estimated from
aggregate data be denoted as 
0
i.
Remark 1 When aggregate data are used to estimate CTR, the ratio i=i 1 is overesti-
mated due to the presence of the aggregation bias.7
Due to this overestimation, advertisers might bid incorrectly. As the equilibrium considered
here is ex-post, the advertisers' bidding strategies depend neither on their beliefs about each
others valuations nor on the fact that some advertisers might be using aggregate data. The
bidding strategies continue to be similar to the one outlined in Equation 2.9, but the bids
in this case, b
0
1; : : : ; b
0
K , might be dierent.
8 We consider two extreme cases to study the
impact of aggregation bias { (i) all advertisers except one use complete data and, (ii) all
advertisers use aggregate data. Let the search-engine revenue in Case I(II) be denoted by

AI(II)
S and advertisers' prot by 
AI(II)
i .
Case I: Suppose advertisers other than Advertiser j have access to complete data and can
compute i correctly. Only Advertiser j uses aggregate data and overestimates 1. This
leads him to overestimate the ratio i=i 1 and he bids in the following manner.
b
0
j(sj ; i; h) = sj  

0
i

0
i 1
(sj   b0i+1): (2.10)
As Advertiser j bids lower in equilibrium and occupies a position j
0  j. The follow-
ing proposition characterizes the equilibrium in this case (detailed analysis and proofs are
provided in Appendix C).
Proposition 3 (i) If only Advertiser j uses aggregate data, the top advertisers (i  j) bid
lower, advertisers in between (j < i  j0) bid higher and the remaining advertisers (i > j0)
bid the same as they would have when everyone had complete data. (ii) The payos of the
7Writing the CTR in terms of the logit model we get, i
i 1 =
expf0+1ig
1+expf0+1ig
1+expf0+1(i 1)g
expf0+1(i 1)g  expf1g
when CTRs are small. Since ^1;s > ^1;c ) i=i 1 < 0i=
0
i 1.
8We continue to assume that Advertiser K + 1 still bids 0.
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search engine and Advertiser j decrease (AIS < 
C
S ;
AI
j < 
C
j ) while all other advertisers
receive payos that are either the same or higher than payos they would have received if
all advertisers were using complete data (AIi  Ci ; i 6= j).
Advertiser j underestimates the impact of position and incorrectly bids lower which might
move him to a lower position. In turn, some advertisers who were below him move up one
position. The ordering of these advertisers does not change, which is a consequence of the
bidding policy (Edelman et al., 2007). As b
0
j < bj0 , bids required to acquire all positions
above j
0
decrease. As bids for all position are (weakly) lower, the search engine loses rev-
enue. Clearly, Advertiser j's payo is lower, because he deviates from the optimal policy.
However, the loss in revenue for the search engine is substantially higher than the loss in
revenue for the advertiser using aggregate data. Interestingly, all these losses are transferred
to the other advertisers (6= j) as excess surplus since GSP is a zero-sum game. Hence, the
search engine suers the most due to aggregation bias and all advertisers apart from j are
better o due to aggregation. In the subsequent case, we observe that the search engine
internalizes all the negative impact of aggregation.
Case II: When all advertisers use aggregate data, their estimate of the CTR, 
0
i are greater
than the actual CTR as shown in Proposition 3. For simplicity, we assume that all adver-
tisers arrive at the same estimates for 
0
i.
9 As a result, Advertiser k adopts the following
bidding strategy,
b
0
k(sj ; i; h) = sk  

0
i

0
i 1
(sk   b0i+1):
It is easy to see that the bid placed by advertiser K (the last advertiser) is less than the
bid he would have placed had he estimated CTR from complete data. Proceeding in an
iterative fashion we can show that all advertisers place a lower bid. The equilibrium in this
case is specied in the following proposition.
9This result continues to hold even if the advertisers arrive at dierent estimates of 
0
i as long as i=i 1 <

0
i=
0
i 1, which always hold true due to aggregation bias as shown earlier.
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Proposition 4 (i) When all advertisers use aggregate data, the advertisers are arranged
in assortive order. The resulting bids are lower than the bids when complete data are used
(b
0
i < bi; i = 1; : : : ;K). (ii) Search-engine revenue is lower (
A2
S < 
C
S ) and advertisers'
payo are higher (A2i > 
C
i ) as compared to the complete case.
In Appendix C, we show that the advertisers bid less than what they would have had they
known the actual CTR. As all the advertisers use the same incorrect estimate of the CTR,
the eventual ranking remains the same as in the complete case. They receive the same
number of clicks but at a lower CPC and hence their payos are higher. Surprisingly, the
search-engine revenue suers the most when all advertisers use aggregate data even though
the advertisers make the wrong decisions. These results question the data standards that
have become common in SSA and underscore the need to provide better data to advertisers.
We also show that it is incentive compatible for search engine to provide richer/better data
to advertisers.
Note that an advertiser always receives a higher payo when he uses complete data as
compared to aggregate data, irrespective of the fraction of advertisers using aggregate data.
This intuition is formalized in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 An advertiser can always increase his payo from SSA by unilaterally using
complete data instead of aggregate data.
The dierence in payo between the two cases (complete v/s aggregate) can be considered
as the value of complete data or alternately the disutility from aggregate data. In the
following section, we analyze a large dataset from a leading search engine. The purpose of
this analysis is two folds: Firstly, we quantify the magnitude of the bias and show that it is
signicant in the context of SSA. Secondly, we use these estimates to compute the revenue
implications of the bias for the search engine and a representative advertiser.
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2.4. Empirical Analysis
2.4.1. Data Description
We analyze a disaggregate dataset from a major search engine that contains 22 million
unique impressions chosen randomly from all user queries between August 10, 2007 and
September 25, 2007. This is a very unique dataset as search engines rarely provide impres-
sion level data to advertisers or researchers. For every impression, the dataset contains the
user query, ads shown on the page and number of ads on the preceding pages. Each ad
is identied by a unique ad identier, though the dataset does not contain any ad-specic
information. The dataset also contains information about clicks during this period of obser-
vation. We construct an ad-level dataset, that contains information about the keyword the
advertiser was bidding on and all the impressions of the ad associated with the keyword,
which is similar to the one presented in Table 2.
Table 3: Summary Statistics
Total impressions 8,142,210
Unique queries 24,235
Unique ads 229,960
Ads with more than one impression 184,481
Mean impressions for every ad 64.4
Median impressions for every ad 7.0
There is ample evidence that there is substantial variation in position and reporting the
average position alone results in the loss of information on actual position as shown in
Figure 2. We next investigate the impact of data aggregation.
The ad level data described earlier are aggregated at a daily level to create aggregate data.
The data thus generated are similar to the campaign summaries that search engines make
available to the advertisers (as presented in Table 1).
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Figure 2: Mean Intra-day Variation in Position.
2.4.2. Hierarchical Bayesian Model
We estimate a random-eect logit model using Hierarchical Bayesian (HB) techniques that
are commonly used in SSA. As our data do not contain any ad-specic attributes, the only
covariate included in our models is position. The eect of ad characteristics is captured in
the ad-specic intercept term. We demonstrate the aggregation bias for HB model.
We extend the binary choice logit model proposed earlier in Section 3 to account for multiple
keywords. Under this specication, the consumer's utility from clicking on ad k during
impression i is given by
Uik = 0k + 1kposik + ik (2.11)
where ik is the idiosyncratic, logistically distributed error term. k = (0k; 1k)
0
are
keyword specic parameters which are assumed to be random and heterogeneous across
ads. It is drawn from a multivariate normal distribution in the following manner:
k  N2(; V) where V =
0B@ 0 01
01 1
1CA :
Similar models have been extensively used in prior research in SSA (Ghose and Yang,
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2009; Yang and Ghose, 2010). Note that although this random coecient model captures
heterogeneity across ads, it still fails to accounts for the intra-day variation in posik if the
model is estimated on aggregate data. As a result, we expect the aggregation bias to extend
to the random-coecient model as well. To test this hypothesis, we take a random sample
of ads from our data and apply the model in Equation 2.11 to both the disaggregate and
aggregate datasets and compare the estimates.
The log-likelihood function for the complete data is as follows
LL(jcomplete data) =
KX
k=1
IKX
i=1
Yik log pik + (1  Yik) log(1  pik); (2.12)
where Yik is the indicator variable that denotes whether the i
th impression of keyword k
received a click or not and pik, the click-through probability is given by
pik =
expf0k + 1kvikg
1 + expf0k + 1kvikg : (2.13)
The log-likelihood function for the aggregate data is as follows
LL(jaggregate data) =
KX
k=1
DX
d=1
cdk log pdk + (ndk   cdk) log(1  pdk); (2.14)
where ndk and cdk denote the number of impressions and clicks on day d respectively and
pdk, the click-through probability is given by
pdk =
expf0k + 1kwdkg
1 + expf0k + 1kwdkg : (2.15)
As the data on clicks are often sparse for most keywords in sponsored search, the SSA
literature primarily uses Hierarchical Bayesian models. We use a similar approach and
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assume that the mean and variance-covariance martix for k have the following priors
  N2(;); (2.16)
V  1  Wishart(;): (2.17)
The parameters ;; ;; and V
 1
 are estimated separately from the complete and
the aggregate datasets using a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) approach. Before
discussing the details of the MCMC estimation procedure, we discuss some identication
issues associated with the model presented here.
2.4.3. Identication
The ad position in the previous exposition has been assumed to be exogenous. However,
the position is decided by the bids placed by the advertiser. In addition, we know that
past performance aects the quality score of the ad which in turn aects the position. The
auction process and historical performance jointly determine the position which is one of the
most important strategic variables advertisers focus on in SSA. This indicates that position
is endogenous (i.e. E[postt] 6= 0) and the endogeneity should be explicitly incorporated in
the HB model presented earlier.
Endogenity has been a major concern in the SSA literature and researchers have proposed
several techniques to address this issue. Ghose and Yang (2009) and Yang and Ghose
(2010) use a simultaneous equation model to address this problem. Their simultaneous
model forms a triangular system of equations which can be identied without any further
identication constraints. Agarwal et al. (2011) use a series of random bids to address the
endogenous nature of position. In their specication, position is completely determined by
the random bids and quality score which are exogenous. Recent econometric advances have
lead to the development of the latent instrument variable (LIV) framework (Ebbes et al.,
2005) which has been used by Rutz et al. (2012) to account for position endogeneity. The
LIV framework uses a likelihood based approach, which can be easily integrated with the
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HB model proposed earlier, and can be estimated using the MCMC estimator.
In a LIV formulation, the endogenous covariate is decomposed into a stochastic term that
is uncorrelated with the error and another one that is possibly correlated with the error,
i.e. X =  +  where  is the uncorrelated part of X such that E[] = 0 and E[] = .
As  varies in the dataset, it is possible to identify the correlation between  and , denoted
by . The LIV approach is extended to binary choice models by introducing a latent
categorical variable withM categories (Rutz et al., 2012). Position can assume any of these
M categorical values with a probability  = f1; 2; : : : ; Mg,
PM
m=1. More specically,
poskt = 
0
kt +Z
0
kt + kt; (2.18)
where   MultinomialM () is stochastic part of poskt and is exogenous and kt is
endogenous. The errors (kt; kt)
0 are MVN distributed in the following manner
0B@ kt
kt
1CA =MVN
264
0B@ 0
0
1CA ;
0B@  
 
1CA
375 : (2.19)
Zkt represents the observed instruments, and in our analysis we use lagged position as IVs
which is consistent with the approach adopted by Rutz and Bucklin (2011).
2.4.4. Estimation Results
We estimate both the HB model and HB model with LIV (HB-LIV) to draw comparisons
between the two methods. A sample size of 200 ads is chosen for estimating the parameters.
We make this choice primarily for computational convenience as estimating the model on
disaggregate data takes a long time. The disaggregate dataset contains a large number of
observations, hence the estimation on the disaggregate dataset is really slow.10
We start o with diused priors ( = 0; = 100I;  = 5; = I) and rene them as the
estimation proceeds. The exact estimation procedure is outlined in the apendix. We run
10We estimate the HB model on 25 dierent samples and the qualitative ndings remain the same.
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the MCMC simulation for 100,000 draws and the rst 50,000 sample are discarded. The
MCMC chains are stationary after the burn-in period. The MCMC chains are thinned to
remove autocorrelation between draws and every 10th draw in the stationary period is used
for the subsequent analysis.
The estimation results are presented in Table 4. We observe that there are signicant
dierences in the  estimated on the complete and aggregate data, for both the HB
and HB-LIV models. 1 is overestimated by 10% when the estimation is performed on
aggregate data indicating that aggregation bias exists when a HB model is used. The bias
in 1 increases to 12.9% when a HB-LIV model is used. We also observe a statistically
signicant dierence in the estimates from the HB and the HB-LIV model, conforming the
endogenity of position in sponsored search.
Table 4: Estimates of Parameters
HB HB-LIV
Parameters Complete Aggregate Complete Aggregate
:
0 -1.495(0.000) -1.459(0.001) -1.672(0.301) -1.612(0.189)
1 -0.793(0.085) -0.727(0.098) -0.642(0.120) -0.558(0.074)
V :
1 0.654(0.128) 0.753(0.170) 0.678(0.107) 0.689(0.192)
2 0.153(0.037) 0.155(0.038) 0.147(0.033) 0.162(0.042)
12 0.025(0.067) -0.085(0.076) 0.019(0.052) -0.090(0.076)
V:
 0.263(0.067) 0.389(0.082) 0.142(0.047) 0.196(0.065)
 1.733(0.238) 2.113(0.414)
 0.136(0.039) 0.176(0.052)
:
1 0.962 (0.083) 0.748 (0.091)
2 2.838 (0.029) 2.364 (0.037)
3 4.552 (0.012) 5.927 (0.045)
:
1 0.523 (0.255) 0.322 (0.181)
2 0.238 (0.173) 0.193 (0.127)
Instrument Variable:
post 1 0.885(0.096) 0.766(0.127)
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We use the dierences between the estimates from summary and complete data for a random
sample of 5000 exact-match keywords to compute the empirical distribution of the error
(" = ^s   ^c) due to aggregation (Figure 4). This empirical distribution is used in Section
6.2 to quantify the impact of aggregation bias on search engine and advertiser revenues.
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Figure 3: HB Estimation on complete and aggregate data. The red dotted lines represent
the mean of the respective coecients' distribution.
Error Distribution
β^0s − β^0c
β^ 1s
−
β^ 1c
 0.2 
 0.4 
 0.6 
 0.8 
 
1 
 1.2 
 1.4 
−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
−
0.
2
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Figure 4: Error distribution estimated by computing the dierence between the estimates
from aggregate data and complete data.
27
2.4.5. Insights from Empirical Analysis
In general, we observe considerable bias in the estimates presented earlier although there
is signicant heterogeneity across keywords.11 The bias is more signicant in the case of
broad-match ad compared to exact-match ads. Ads that have more competitors are prone to
more aggregation bias than ads that have fewer competing advertisers. As the competition
increases, there are more bidders in the keyword auction and frequent changes in bids by
them might lead to higher intra-day variability in the ad position. Due to the increased
intra-day variation, broad-match ads and ads with a large number of competitors are more
prone to aggregation bias. We also observe that the bias increases as the eect of position
becomes stronger. In summary, aggregation bias is signicant when broad-match ads are
used, there is signicant competition or the estimated eect of position on CTR is large.
Under such conditions, the model should explicitly account for the intra-day variation in
position to accurately recover the parameters of the model. Advertisers can ignore the
eects of aggregation when the impact of position on CTR is negligible.
2.5. Managerial Implications
In the previous section, we showed the existence of aggregation bias using the HB and
HB-LIV models. In this section, we discuss the managerial implications of the bias. We
start by quantifying the impact of aggregation bias on advertiser and search engine prots.
Then, we discuss how aggregation bias might aect other managerial decisions like keyword
selection.
2.5.1. Revenue implications
We now apply recent research by Ghose and Yang (2009) to quantify the impact of ag-
gregation on advertiser and search-engine revenues. The analysis complements the theo-
retical investigation in Section 6.1. Given the coecients estimated from aggregate and
disaggregate data, Ghose and Yang's model helps identify an advertiser's optimal bids and
11M The regression is presented in Table 6 in the appendix
28
associated payos for the two cases. It does not however elaborate on the bids and payos
of other advertisers. This precludes equilibrium analysis of all players in the market but
allows us to examine whether and to what extent a unilateral switch to disaggregate data
by an advertiser aects that advertiser's payo and the search engine's revenues from that
advertiser.
This analysis requires three main inputs. First, for any keyword we need to know the
magnitude of the bias due to aggregation (i.e. coecients ^s and ^c). Next, we need to
compute the impact of this bias on the bids placed by the advertiser (i.e. how an advertiser's
bids depend on ^). Finally, we need to quantify how any change in the advertiser's bid
aects the advertiser's and search engine's revenues. Our analysis in Section 5 provides
the input for the rst step. Specically, Figure 4 identies the distribution of the error
" = ^s   ^c. Thus, given any ^s, we can compute a distribution of the true coecient
^c. In order to compute how these coecients translate into bid choices and eventually to
advertiser/search-engine revenues, we rely on Ghose and Yang's model. They model the
CTR for an ad as
CTR =
expf0 + 1pos+ 2Retailer + 3Brand+ 4Lengthg
1 + expf0 + 1pos+ 2Retailer + 3Brand+ 4Lengthg ;
where Retailer, Brand are dummies that equal 1 when the keyword associated with the
ad contains retailer and brand information, respectively. Length measures the number of
words in the keyword. The mean value of these variables in Ghose and Yang (2009) are
as follows: Retailer = 0:004, Brand = 0:427 and Length = 2:632.12 The position of the
ad, pos is a function of the advertiser's bid; as the bid increases, the ad moves to a higher
position. In their model, pos = e1:98 1:93CPC, where CPC is the advertiser's cost-per-click
or bid. Suppose I is the number of ad impressions for a keyword and m is the expected
revenue per-click, then the advertiser's prot is given by the number of clicks (I  CTR)
12The CTR estimated from aggregate data = expf 1:65+1:290:08 0:230:43 0:112:63 0:31posg
1+expf 1:65+1:290:08 0:230:43 0:112:63 0:31posg =
expf 1:96 0:31posg
1+expf 1:96 0:31posg
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times the prot per click (m CPC). The advertiser chooses CPC to maximize his prots,
CPC = argmax
CPC
I  CTR (m  CPC); (2.20)
It is easy to see the tradeo between bidding high to get more clicks (CTR increases with
CPC) and bidding low to earn greater prot per click.
The optimal bids can be computed by substituting the expression for CTR (as a function
of advertiser's CPC) into the prot function. In order to compute the optimal bids, we
use the mean estimates from Ghose and Yang (2009) ((0; 1) = ( 1:96; 0:31)0) and treat
them as coecients estimated from aggregate data (^s) for a keyword of interest.
13 Given
the coecients from the aggregate data, the coecients from the complete data are given
by ^c = ^s   ", where " is a random draw from the error distribution discussed earlier
in Section 5.3.2. The error distribution is used to arrive at an empirical distribution of
^c conditional on ^s. We sample ^c from this distribution and, for each ^c, compute
the optimal bid that maximizes advertiser prot in Equation (2.20). Figure 5 shows the
distribution of optimal bids computed in this manner when the revenue per-click, m = $1,
and $4. The optimal CPCs computed from aggregate data are shown as the dashed lines in
Figure 5 and equal $0.48 and $1.29 when m=$1 and $4, respectively. The bids computed
using ^s are less than almost all the bids computed using samples of ^c. This nding
supports our earlier claim that aggregation bias results in the advertiser placing a bid lower
than is optimal.
We next use the computed CPC to estimate the eect of aggregation bias on advertiser
and search-engine revenues. Figure 6 shows the % loss suered by the advertiser due to
aggregation bias. The average loss for the representative ad is around 6% in this example.
This loss is between 4-8% when the revenue per-click is less than $2, which is quite typical
for the ads considered in Ghose and Yang (2009). There is a great deal of variation in this
13The eect of factors like Retailer etc. is subsumed in the intercept term in accordance with the analysis
in Section 5.2.
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Figure 5: Optimal bids computed by maximizing Equation (2.20) for dierent estimates of
.
loss and in some cases the advertiser may lose more than 10-15% of his SSA prots. The
impact of aggregation bias is more pronounced when the advertiser's valuation for the click
is low, as in this situation, he bids lower and even small deviations from the optimal bid can
lead to signicant changes in the position leading to signicantly lower payos. When the
advertiser's valuation is high, he prefers to be ranked higher and his bid is correspondingly
higher. Under this condition, deviations from the optimal bid are small and hence the
protability is not aected as much.
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Figure 6: Loss in revenues caused due to Aggregation bias.
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The eect of aggregation is considerably higher for the search engine. On average, it loses
more that 20% of its payments from the advertiser as a result of aggregation bias. Lower
bids, as a consequence of aggregation bias, negatively impact search-engine revenues in two
ways { Firstly, lower bids imply that the search engine generates lesser revenue per-click.
Secondly, the ad appears at a lower position due to the lower bid, which in turn leads to
fewer clicks. The advertiser pays the search engine for fewer clicks and pays less for each
click. In this example, we estimate that the search engine loses 1.4¢ for every impression
of the representative ad. Given the large number of impressions for this advertiser, the
search engine loses several thousand dollars in payment from the advertiser every week due
to aggregation bias.14
1 2 3 4 5
0
10
00
0
20
00
0
30
00
0
40
00
0
Loss in Search Engine Revenue
Revenue (in dollars) per click (m)
W
e
e
kl
y 
Lo
ss
 (in
 do
lla
rs)
Mean loss
90% interval
Figure 7: Loss in search-engine revenue caused due to Aggregation bias.
In the preceding analysis we considered how payments of one advertiser to the search engine
are aected due to aggregation bias. Naturally, the dynamics are more complicated when we
try to quantify the eect that the bias has on payments by other advertisers and the overall
protability of the search engine. For example, when an advertiser bids sub-optimally and
moves to a lower position, another advertiser moves up to occupy the vacant position.
Though the search engine loses revenue from the advertiser that moved down, it earns
more from the advertiser that moved up, reducing the overall loss suered by the search
14The advertiser considered in Ghose and Yang (2009) has a portfolio of 1878 unique ads and an ad on
average has 411 impressions weekly. Total weekly loss  411 impressions1878 unique ad$0:014 = $11; 038
(compare to weekly revenues of $19,377).
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engine. It is dicult to accurately measure this eect as we do not have data from multiple
advertisers, but we can estimate a lower bound for the loss suered by the search engine.
To estimate a lower bound, we assume that, even though the advertiser with aggregate data
bids lower, his position does not change. As a result, the number of clicks on the ad do
not change. The search engine loses revenues only because this advertiser chooses a lower
CPC. The weekly loss suered by the search engine in this case is 17% ( $3; 800/week or
0.43 ¢/impression) which is the lower bound for the overall loss experienced by the search
engine.
2.5.2. Eect on Keyword Selection
Until now, we have mainly focused on how aggregation aects the estimation of the coe-
cient of position and subsequently, equilibrium payos. Aggregation bias also aects other
managerial decisions like keyword selection. Given a limited budget, advertisers need to
select a portfolio of keywords from several billion keywords available to them. Ghose and
Yang (2009) and Rutz et al. (2012) propose several models that oer insights into keyword
selection. Ghose and Yang (2009) suggest that ads associated with retailer specic keywords
are more protable than those associated with brand specic keyword. Rutz et al. (2012)
provide a strategy to select optimal keywords based on factors like wordographics, keyword
length, generic versus specic etc. It is important to note that aggregation bias also aects
the estimates of these factors. As the simulations in Section 4.2 show, the impact of brand
on click-through is, in fact, attenuated. Models that do not account for aggregation bias,
might cause advertisers to make suboptimal tradeos in their keyword selection decisions.
2.6. Suggested Cures
In the previous discussion we outlined the problem of aggregation bias and some of its im-
plications. As mentioned earlier, aggregation bias arises due to inadequate data. It might
not be infeasible for search engines to store and report impression level data due to the size
of such datasets and potential privacy concerns. However, the search engine can provide
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dierent data to reduce the eect of aggregation. In this section, we explore various sum-
mary statistics and measure the improvement they oer over the standard aggregate data
provided by search engines. We also consider a few modeling approaches which explicitly
account for the variation in position and estimate the improvement oered by them.15 We
continue to use the HB-LIV model for the subsequent analysis, but post varies based on
the summary statistics reported and the position model used. We rst present the dierent
datasets and then discuss the comparison between these datasets in Table 5.
Table 5: Comparative performance of various data summarization approaches.
Method Data Requirement MAPE("0) MAPE("1)
Dierent Ways of Aggregation
Arithmetic Mean O(X) 53.4% 28.9%
Geometric Mean O(X) 42.1% 17.5%
Harmonic Mean O(X) 40.3% 10.2%
Poisson Model O(X) 43.3% 22.8%
Mean and Variance O(2X) 15.2% 7.8%
Empirical Distribution O(2X) 9.8% 4.2%
Position-level Summary O(NX) 0% 0%
2.6.1. Sample Mean
Dierent Ways of Aggregation
An important reason for bias is the non-linearity of the position-ctr curve. As a result, lin-
ear aggregation of the position does not yield the correct underlying response parameters.
Christen et al. (1997) and Danaher et al. (2008) show that when the response is multiplica-
tive, i.e. of the form x11 x
2
2 : : :, where xi are marketing mix variables, an aggregate model
should use geometric means to correctly estimate the coecients. Unfortunately, there is
no analytical analog of this result when the underlying model is logit. We use both the ge-
15We thank the reviewers for recommending this extension.
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ometric and harmonic means and empirically compare which method of aggregation works
better in sponsored search. As the position-ctr curve is convex in nature, both these aggre-
gation methods perform better than linear aggregation, but the harmonic mean performs
better than the geometric mean. This implies that if the search engine wants to provide
only the mean position in the campaign reports, it should provide the harmonic mean of the
position. This result also suggests that researchers who aggregate sponsored search data at
a weekly or a monthly level for lack of sucient data or computational reasons should use
the harmonic mean for aggregation.
Modeling Position Variation using a Poisson
We also consider a model where Vt is drawn from a Poisson distribution with mean equal
to the (arithmetic) mean u. The log-likelihood of observing the data in this case is given
by
LL(jdata; ) =
KX
k=1
DX
d=1
cdk log
( 1X
i=0
P (Vidk = v)pidk
)
+ (ndk   cdk) log
(
1 
1X
i=0
P (Vidk = v)pidk
)
;
(2.21)
where  is a K  D matrix, and every column of  contains the scale parameter of the
Poisson distribution for every day. The position of every impression Vidk for keyword k
on the dth day is drawn from a Poisson distribution with kd = kd and the probability
P (Vidk = v) = 
v
dke
dk=v!. As we see from Table 5, this approach does not perform very well
because the ad position does not follow a Poisson distribution. We conrm this observation
using the Neyman-Scott test.
2.6.2. Higher Order Statistics
If the search engine provided higher order moments in addition to the mean, the aggrega-
tion bias can be reduced signicantly. We discuss three approaches with increasing data
requirements.
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Mean and Variance
In case the mean (dk) and variance (
2
dk) of position are provided, we assume that the
position has a negative binomial distribution (NBD). The NBD makes intuitive sense as the
success of probability p of an NBD, can can be thought of as the probability of a competing
advertiser placing a higher bid. The log-likelihood function is similar to Equation 2.21, but
the distribution of ad position in this model is given by
P (Vidk = v) =
0B@ v + rdk   1
v
1CA (1  pdk)rdk(1  pdk)v;
where pdk =
dk
dk
and rdk =
2dk
dk   dk :
We observe that using both the mean and the variance to model the variation in the position
signicantly improves the parameter estimates.
Empirical Distribution
If the search engine provides the empirical distribution of the ad position, the variation
in position can be modeled non-parametrically. In this case, the log-likelihood is given by
Equation 2.21, where P (Vidk = v) is provided by the empirical distribution. This summa-
rization technique performs better than all the preceding techniques.
2.6.3. Sucient Statistics
Position-Level Summary
Although the complete dataset entirely eliminates aggregation bias, it might dicult for
search engines due to privacy or technical concerns. However, the search engine can provide
a position-level summary which are sucient statistics for the logit model as we show below.
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Equation 2.12 can be written as
LL(jcomplete data) =
KX
k=1
DX
d=1
1X
v=1
cvdk log pvdk + (nvdk   cvdk) log(1  pvdk); (2.22)
where nvdk and cvdk are the number of impressions and clicks on the k
th ad at position v on
the dth day, respectively. Hence, the position-level summary are sucient to correctly esti-
mate the parameters of the model. It can observed from Table 5 that the model estimated
from a position-level data does not suer from aggregation bias.
2.6.4. Discussion
The preceding analysis presents dierent data summarization techniques in increasing order
of the data requirement. Our analysis shows that if the search engine wishes to report only
the mean position, it is best to provide the harmonic mean. The aggregation bias decreases
signicantly as more data is used for estimation. When both the mean and variance are
used in the estimation process, not only is there a reduction in the aggregation bias but
there is also a considerable decrease in the error in ^0s. Using the empirical distribution
marginally improves the estimation performance. When the position-level summary is used,
the aggregation bias is completely eliminated. However, this technique requires substantially
more data as compared to the other techniques. As we show in the preceding sections, it
is in the search engine's interest to provide better data to advertisers. The appropriate
dataset should be determined as a tradeo between the loss due to aggregation and the
costs associated with providing richer data to advertisers.
2.7. Conclusions
Search engine advertising is fast emerging as an important and popular medium of adver-
tising for several rms. The medium oers rich data for advertisers on consumer click and
conversion behavior. As a result, there has been considerable interest in analyzing SSA
data among practitioners and researchers. Several models have been proposed to study
consumer behavior and inform advertiser strategies.
37
This paper makes three main contributions. First, we demonstrate the existence of aggrega-
tion bias and its eect on the equilibrium of the SSA auction. We show that equilibrium bids
are lower when advertisers use aggregate data. As a result the search engine's revenues are
always lower due to the bias. Second, we use a large search engine dataset and quantify the
magnitude of the bias and measure its economic impact. We also provide insights about the
drivers of the bias and suggest conditions under which practitioners and researchers can't
ignore this bias. Third, we present various summarization techniques that can be used by
search engines to provide better datasets to advertisers.
These ndings have important managerial and economic implications. Advertisers com-
monly use aggregate data provided by search engines to guide their bidding strategies. Our
results suggest that advertisers might not be bidding optimally in these auctions because
they overestimate the clicks obtainable at a given position. This not only impacts the ad-
vertisers negatively, but also leads to a reduction in the revenue of the advertiser. Given
the size of the SSA industry, these losses can translate into several million dollars of lost
revenues for the search engines. Our study points out that the current format of the data
provided to advertisers is not adequate, and search engines should take steps to address
this problem. We recognize that it might be infeasible for search engines to store and re-
port impression level data due to the size of such datasets and potential privacy concerns.
However, these constraints do not imply that it is infeasible to provide adequate data to ad-
vertisers. We provide guidelines to search engines about the nature of datasets that can be
provided to researchers and quantify the reduction in the bias that each of these techniques
can achieve.
We also nd that, as a result of aggregation bias, consumer response to other ad attributes,
such as ad text or branding, may also have been incorrectly estimated. Thus advertisers
must be cautious in applying the biased estimates to guide key managerial decisions such
as ad design and keyword selection. In the absence of adequate data from search engines,
advertisers and researchers must take into account the variation in ad position within a day.
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This can be determined by examining if multiple queries are matched to a single keyword
(match type is broad) and if bids of competitors change considerably within a given day. If
the ad position for a keyword is somewhat stable across impressions within a day, the bias
is likely to be low and existing random utility models can be applied on aggregate data.
Our study focuses mainly on demonstrating the existence and direction of aggregation bias
in the coecient of position and identifying some economic consequences of this bias. An
interesting and related question is how aggregation aects ad attributes like wordographics,
presence of brand information, ad creative etc. and whether their coecients also suer from
aggregation bias. In this paper, the eect of ad attributes is subsumed in the intercept term
as we do not have data on ad attributes. A richer dataset that contains ad characteristics
might help in a more extensive analysis of this issue. Another direction for future research
is building models that endogenize the variation in position. The variation in position
can be modeled using probabilistic models or structural methods. In ongoing work, we
are developing a model that explicitly accounts for the intra-day variation in position and
would therefore not suer from aggregation bias.
SSA presents an exciting opportunity to understand consumer behavior and drivers of
rms' advertising strategy. Through this paper we hope to inform the practitioners about
the inadequacies of the data standards commonly used in SSA so that they can take steps
to address these problems. We also identify issues with some common modeling techniques
in SSA so that subsequent research in this emerging area is informed about these issues.
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Appendix
Proofs of Equations and Propositions
Let Yi denote an indicator variable that equals 1 if the i
th impression resulted in a click and
zero otherwise. We assume that the clicks are independent of each other and hence Yis are
independent.The log likelihood of observing the dataset with a total of I ad impressions is
given by
LL(jdata) =
IX
i=1
yi log pi + (1  yi) log(1  pi):
Proof of Equations
Proof of Equation (2.3)
The rst order condition (F.O.C) for Equation (2.23) is as follows
@LL
@
=
IX
i=1
fyi(1  pi)  (1  yi)pig x0i = 0;
=
IX
i=1
fyi   pig x0i = 0:
where xi = (1 vi)
0. Since we know that LL(jdata) is a convex function in  (Hayashi,
2000) this F:O:C gives us the following two equations
C =
IX
i=1
pi; (2.23)
IX
i=1
yivi =
IX
i=1
vipi: (2.24)
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Dividing Equation (2.23) by I we get
obsctr =
C
I
=
1
I
IX
i=1
pi: (2.25)
Proof of Equation (2.7)
Let the number of impressions on day d be denoted by nd and the number of clicks by cd;PD
d=1 nd = I and
PD
d=1 cd = C. The probability of clicking on the ad on day d is given by
pd =
expf0 + 1wdg
1 + expf0 + 1wdg : (2.26)
The log-likelihood of observing the aggregate data for D days is given by
LL(jdata) =
DX
d=1
cd log pd + (nd   cd) log(1  pd) (2.27)
Evaluating the rst order condition for Equation (2.27)
@LL
@
=
DX
d=1
fcd(1  pd)  (nd   cd)pdg x0d = 0;
=
DX
d=1
fcd   ndpdg x0d = 0;
where xd = (1 wd)
0, which in turn gives us
DX
d=1
cd = C =
DX
d=1
ndpd; (2.28)
DX
d=1
wdcd =
DX
d=1
ndwdpd: (2.29)
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Dividing Equation (2.28) by I we get
obsctr =
C
I
=
DX
d=1
ndpd
I
: (2.30)
Proof of Lemma 2
We use the following result from Muller and Stoyan (2002, page 27) to prove this result.
Let V1; :::; Vn be iid random variables and f1; :::; fn measurable real functions. Dene the
function f by
f(v) =
1
n
nX
i=1
fi(v):
Then,
nX
i=1
f(Vi) cx
nX
i=1
fi(Vi):
Using this result we now prove that Wn cx V , where Wn is the average position when
there are exactly n impressions on the day. Let fi(v) = v=(n   1) for all i = 1; : : : ; n   1
and fn(v)  0.
f(v) =
1
n
n 1X
i=1
v=(n  1) = v
n
:
Since
nX
i=1
f(Vi) =
1
n
nX
i=1
Vi and
nX
i=1
fi(Vi) =
1
n  1
n 1X
i=1
Vi ) 1
n
nX
i=1
Vi cx 1
n  1
n 1X
i=1
Vi:
Proceeding in a recursive manner
1
n  1
n 1X
i=1
Vi cx 1
n  2
n 2X
i=1
Vi;
: : :
V1 + V2
2
cx V:
)Wn = 1
n
nX
i=1
Vi cx 1
n  1
n 1X
i=1
Vi cx : : : cx V1 + V2
2
cx V
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Let g be any convex function
As E[g(W )] =
1X
i=1
g(Wn)P (n);) E [E[g(W )]] = E
" 1X
i=1
g(Wn)P (n)
#
;
) E [E[g(W )]] =
1X
i=1
E [g(Wn)]P (n) 
1X
i=1
E [g(V )]P (n) = E [g(V )]
1X
i=1
P (n) = E [g(V )] ;
as P (n) is a probability measure. Therefore W cx V .
Proof of Proposition 1
Assuming I is large we can apply Chevychev's law of large numbers to rewrite Equation
(2.3) as
obsctr = E
"
e^0;c+^1;cV
1 + e^0;c+^1;cV
#
: (2.31)
If we have a large enough observation period, Equation (2.7) can be simplied as
obsctr =
DX
d=1
nde
^0;s+^1;swn
I(1 + e^0;s+^1;swn)
= E
"
e^0;s+^1;sW
1 + e^0;s+^1;sW
#
:
As the observed ctr, obsctr is same in both the cases,
E
"
e^0;c+^1;cV
1 + e^0;c+^1;cV
#
= E
"
e^0;s+^1;sW
1 + e^0;s+^1;sW
#
: (2.32)
As the convex ordering in Lemma 2 holds and logit is a convex in position for 0 < 0 (which
is a reasonable assumption in SSA as the CTR on the topmost position is less that 0.2 in
all cases), it follows from the denition of convex ordering that
E
"
e^0;c+^1;cV
1 + e^0;c+^1;cV
#
 E
"
e^0;s+^1;sW
1 + e^0;s+^1;sW
#
; (2.33)
if ^c = ^s. The equality holds only when FV (:) = FW (:) i.e. which hold only under few
special cases (e.g. when there is exactly one impression every day or there is no intra-day
variation in position). Since Equation (2.32) and Equation (2.33) cannot simultaneously be
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true and Equation (2.32) always holds we prove by contradiction that ^c 6= ^s.
Proof of Proposition 2
i) Since we know that
E
"
e^0;c+^1;cV
1 + e^0;c+^1;cV
#
= E
"
e^0;s+^1;sW
1 + e^0;s+^1;sW
#
;
and by denition of convex order
E
"
e^0;c+^1;cV
1 + e^0;c+^1;cV
#
 E
"
e^0;c+^1;cW
1 + e^0;c+^1;cW
#
;
we can say that
E
"
e^0;s+^1;sW
1 + e^0;s+^1;sW
#
 E
"
e^0;c+^1;cW
1 + e^0;c+^1;cW
#
:
As this result hold for any distribution of W , this relation should hold pointwise for the
two function.
) e
^0;s+^1;sx
1 + e^0;s+^1;sx
 e
^0;c+^1;cx
1 + e^0;c+^1;cx
ii) The preceding relationship implies that
e^0;s+^1;sx  e^0;c+^1;cx 8x  0
) ^1;s > ^1;c
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Proof of Proposition 3
(i) We assume that advertiser j moves to position j
0
if he uses aggregate data. Since j
0
ends
up higher than j in equilibrium, b
0
j(sj ; j
0
; h) < bj0(sj0 ; j
0; h) or
1
j0 1
((j0 1   j0 )sj0 + j0 bj0+1) >
1

0
j
0 1
((
0
j0 1   
0
j0 )sj + 
0
j0 bj0+1); (2.34)
which also implies that his bid in the equilibrium decreases, i.e. b
0
j < bj0 . In addition, as b
0
j
is lower than bj , j
0  j. The bids for all the advertisers in this case are as follows:
b
0
i =
1
i 1
 
KX
k=i
(k   k+1)sk
!
for i > j
0
;
b
0
j =
1

0
j
0 1
0@(0
j0 1   
0
j0 )sj +

0
j0
j0
j
0
+1X
k=i
(k   k+1)sk
1A ;
b
0
i =
1

0
i 2
0@ j0X
k=i
(i 2   i 1)si + j0+1b
0
j
1A for j0  i > j;
b
0
i =
1

0
i 1
 
j 1X
k=i
(i 1   i)si + j 1b0j+1
!
for i < j:
As h do not change for advertisers below j
0
, therefore their bids remain the same. It is easy
to see that advertisers j + 1 to j
0
end up bidding higher, i.e. b
0
i > bi for j < i  j
0
though
they moves up by 1 position.
We now show that the bid associated with every position  j0 is lower than when complete
data is used. Lets consider the bid b
0
j0 , placed by advertiser j
0
who occupies position j
0   1.
We start o by showing that b
0
j0 < bj
0 1.
b
0
j0   bj0 1 =
1
j0 2
((j0 2   j0 1) (sj0   sj0 1)| {z }
<0 by construction
+j0 1 (b
0
j   bj0 )| {z }
<0 by assumption
) < 0:
So the bid for position j
0   1 is lower than the bid in the complete case. Proceeding in a
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similar manner it is easy to show that bids for all positions above j
0   1 will also be lower.
This implies that b
0
i < bi for i < j (these ads do not change position). To summarize {
b
0
j < bj , b
0
i < bi for i < j, b
0
i > bi for j < i  j
0
and b
0
i = bi for i > j
0
.
(ii) As all the bids are either the same or lower in this case, search-engine revenue is lower
(A2S < 
C
S ). The payo of advertiser j is lower as any deviation from the optimal bidding
policy results in a strictly lower payo. Advertisers j
0
+ 1 onwards receive the same payo
and all other advertisers are better o due to suboptimal bid by advertiser j. Starting o
with advertiser j
0
,
A2
j0  Cj0 = (j0 1   j0 )sj0   j0 1b
0
j + j0 b
0
j0+1
= (j0 1   j0 )sj0 + j0 bj0+1  
j0 1

0
j
0 1
((
0
j0 1   
0
j0 )sj + 
0
j0 bj0+1)
> 0 (by Equation 2.34)
Similarly, using induction we can show that A2i > 
C
i for advertiser i, s.t. j < i  j
0
. For
i < j, the revenues remain the same but the payment to the search engines is lower, hence
their payo are higher for these advertisers too (A2i > 
C
i , i < j).
Proof of Proposition 4
(i) If all advertisers use the same incorrect estimate of i, the optimal bidding policy is
the one proposed by Edelman et al. (2007). They just use 
0
i instead of i to compute the
optimal bids. We can show by induction that b
0
j  bj for all advertisers.
Step 0: Let b
0
K+1 = bK+1 = 0.
Step 1: b
0
K = sK

1  
0
K

0
K 1

< sK

1  KK 1

= bK .
Assuming b
0
j+1 < bj+1,
46
Step j:
b
0
j = sj
 
1  
0
j

0
j 1
!
+

0
j

0
j 1
b
0
j+1
< sj
 
1  
0
j

0
j 1
!
+

0
j

0
j 1
bj+1
< sj

1  j
j 1

+
j
j 1
bj+1
< bj :
Hence, b
0
j < bj 8j  K.
(ii) Since all advertisers occupy the same position as they did earlier and pay less, search
engine prots are lower ( A1S < 
C
S ). The advertisers' payo in the case are higher:
A1i = i(si   b
0
i+1) > i(si   bi+1) = Ci from Proposition 5 (i).
Proof of Proposition 6
Lets assume that Advertiser j uses aggregate data and appears at a position j
0
. Let the
equilibrium bids be denoted by b
0
1; : : : ; b
0
K ; 0. In the equilibrium, j0 (sj bj0 ) > i(sj bi+1)
8 i 6= j0 . Now suppose that Advertiser j does not have access to aggregate data and
overestimates i=i 1. As a result, he bids lower and moves to position j
00  j0 . Following
the argument in the Proof of Proposition 4, the bids for all positions i, i  j00 decrease
and all other advertisers are better o. As the bids are (weakly) lower, the search-engine
revenue is lower. The payo to Advertiser j is j00 (sj   bj00 ) < j0 (sj   bj0 ) as he found it
optimal to bid for position j
0
when he could correctly estimate the CTR. This implies that
he is worse o using aggregate data.
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Hierarchical Bayesian Estimation
Complete Data
The consumer's utility from clicking on an ad can be modeled as
Ui;k = 0;k + 1;kposi;t + i;k (2.35)
where i;k is the idiosyncratic error term. k  N2(; V); with the hyper-priors  
N(;) and V  1 Wishart(;). This model can be estimated on the complete dataset
using MCMC in the following way.
Step 1: Draw jy;X;;V;;; ;
The posterior density of k can be expressed as
p(jy;X;; V ;;) / l(yj;X;; V ;;)p(j;V ;;)
where
l(yj; X;; V) =
Y
k
Y
i
pyii (1  pi)1 yi
and
p(j; V) /
Y
k
jV j 
1
2 exp

 1
2
(k   )0V  1 (k   )

is the prior density. A random walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is used for sampling k.
Step 2: Draw jy;X;; V ;;; ; using Gibbs sampling
j;  N2(~; ~)
where ~ =
h
KV  1 +
 1
i 1
~ = ~
h
KV  1  +
 1
i
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Step 3: Draw V jy;X; ; ; ;; ; using Gibbs sampling
V  1 Wishart
 
 +K;
"
+
KX
k=1
(k   b)0(k   b)
#!
Initial values:
 = 0
 = 100I
 = number of  coecients + 3
= 5
 = I
 = MLE Estimates from the data
Aggregate Data
The estimation on the aggregate data is performed in a similar way. The consumer's utility
from clicking on an ad on day d can be modeled as
Ud;k = 0;k + 1;kmeanposd;t + d;k (2.36)
The MCMC steps are similar except the likelihood function in Step 1 which changes to
l(yj;X;; V) =
Y
k
Y
d
0B@ nd
cd
1CA pcdd (1  pd)nd cd
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Predictors of Aggregation Bias
Table 6: Predictors of Bias
DV j^0;s   ^0;cj j^1;s   ^1;cj
(Intercept)  0:166  0:119
(0:153) (0:067)
0  0:046  0:044
(0:030) 0:016
1  0:369
(0:066)
21 0:294

(0:023)
BROAD  0:002 0:048
(0:047) (0:021)
U 0:221 0:030
(0:023) (0:012)
U  0:551  0:062
(0:072) (0:015)
2U 0:061

(0:009)
ctr  0:594 0:589
(0:597) (0:217)
ctr  U 1:414
(0:482)
Adj. R2 0.3815 0.4502
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CHAPTER 3 : Optimal Bidding in Multi-Item Multi-Slot Sponsored Search
Auctions
3.1. Introduction
With the growing popularity of search engines among consumers, advertising on search
engines has also grown considerably. Search engine advertising or sponsored search has
several unique characteristics in contrast to traditional advertising and other forms of online
advertising. Compared to traditional advertising in print/television, sponsored search is
highly measurable allowing advertisers to identify which keywords are generating clicks
and which clicks are getting converted to purchases. Compared to other forms of online
advertising such as banner ads, search advertising enjoys much higher click-through (CTR)
and conversion rates. Search queries entered by users convey signicant information about
users current need and context which allow search engines to better target ads to users than
is possible in other forms of online advertising. Further, search engine users, unlike users on
another websites, primarily use the search engine to reach some other website. Advertising
is an eective way to enable that process.
Search engines commonly use Pay Per Click (PPC) auctions to sell their available inventory
of ad positions for any search query. The auction mechanism is referred to as the Generalized
Second Price (GSP) auction. In these auctions, advertisers select keywords of interest, create
brief text ads for the keywords and submit a bid for each keyword which indicates their
willingness to pay for every click. For example, a meat seller may submit the following
set of two tuples f(pork chop, $2), (llet mignon, $5), (steak deals, $3),...g where the rst
element in any two-tuple is the keyword and the second element is the advertiser's bid. Large
advertisers typically bid on hundreds of thousands of keywords at any instant. When a user
types a query, the search engine identies all advertisers bidding on that (or a closely related)
keyword and displays their ads in an ordered list. The search engine uses the advertisers'
bids along with measures of ad relevance to rank order the submitted ads. Whenever a
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consumer clicks on an ad in a given position, the search engine charges the corresponding
advertiser a cost per click (CPC) which is the minimum bid needed to secure that position.
The auctions are continuous sealed bid auctions. That is, advertisers can change their bids
at any time and cannot observe the bids of their competitors. Typically advertisers are
only given summary reports with details such as the total number of impressions, clicks
and conversions, average rank and average CPC for each keyword on a given day. Several
of these auctions are very competitive. For example, it is not uncommon to have 100 or
more advertisers bidding for the same keyword. The average CPC on search engines has
been continually rising over the last couple of years and search advertising is increasingly
becoming a major advertising channel for a large number of rms.
The GSP auction described above diers from traditional auctions in a number of ways.
First, search engines display multiple ads in response to a user query. However, the auction
cannot be treated as a multi-unit auction because each ad position is dierent in the sense
that top positions generate more clicks for the same number of ad impressions. Further,
the CPC decreases as the rank of an ad increases (i.e. the CPC is higher for top ranked
ad than a lower ranked ad). Thus, the advertiser has to trade-o a higher number of clicks
attained at a top position against the lower margin per click. Due to this trade-o, it
may sometimes be better for an advertiser to underbid and sacrice a few clicks in order
to get a higher margin per click. Indeed, several authors have demonstrated that popular
second-price search auctions such as those used by Google and Yahoo are not incentive
compatible (Aggarwal et al., 2006; Edelman et al., 2007). Thus, bidding one's true valuation
is often suboptimal. Further, advertisers have short-term budget constraints which imply
that bids cannot be submitted independently for keywords. For example, if the advertiser
submits a very high bid for the keyword \llet mignon" then it may leave a very limited
portion of the budget for another keyword. The performance of the keywords may also
be interdependent, wherein clicks for one keyword may help generate more searches and
clicks for another. Therefore the bids for the thousands of keywords are inextricably linked.
Finally, considerable uncertainty exists in the sponsored search environment. For example,
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the number of queries for \llet mignon" on any given day is stochastic and is a function of
the weather, special events and a variety of other unknown factors. Similarly, consumer click
behavior cannot be precisely predicted and the bids of competitors are also unknown due
to the sealed bid nature of the auction. The stochasticity in query arrival, consumer click
behavior and competitors' bids imply that the number of clicks and total cost associated
with any bid are all stochastic. All these factors - namely the incentive incompatibility of the
auction, budget constraints, large portfolio of keywords with interdependent performance
and uncertainty in the decision environment - make the advertiser's problem of bidding in
sponsored search a non-trivial optimization problem. In this paper, we formulate and solve
the advertiser's decision problem.
We propose two bidding policies in our paper. The rst policy ignores the interaction be-
tween keywords and is referred to as the \myopic" policy in this paper. We extend this
bidding policy to incorporate interaction between keywords, and refer to this policy as the
\forward-looking" policy since it entails decision making over several time horizons. De-
pending on the advertiser's intent, level of sophistication and nature of the products being
advertised, the advertiser might choose the myopic or the forward-looking policy. This pa-
per makes three main contributions. The rst contribution is towards improving managerial
practice. Advertisers spend billions of dollars on sponsored search. An entire industry of
Search Engine Marketing (SEM) rms have emerged that provide bid management services.
The techniques described in the paper can help increase the Return on Investment (RoI)
for advertisers and SEM rms, as demonstrated in our eld implementation. The second
key contribution is that our approach represents a signicant step forward for the academic
literature on bidding in multi-slot auctions. All the papers to date have studied the problem
either in a deterministic setting or in a single-slot setting and have relied on heuristic solu-
tion techniques due to the complexity of the optimization problem. In contrast, we compute
optimal bids in the more realistic stochastic multi-slot setting. The third contribution of
this paper is that it is the rst paper on bidding in sponsored search to incorporate the
interdependence between keywords into a multi-period bidding problem. The interdepen-
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dence in keyword performance, commonly referred to as spillovers, is a well-documented
feature of sponsored search (Rutz et al., 2012) but has not been considered in the bidding
literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant literature
and position our work within the literature on sponsored search. In Section 3, we formulate
the problem, derive the optimality condition for the myopic policy and discuss how it may
be used to compute the optimal bids. In Section 4, we describe the dataset used for the
analysis presented in this paper. In Section 5, we present the empirical analysis where we
estimate the parameters of our model and run a eld experiment with the bids suggested
by the myopic policy. We compare the optimal bids computed by our model with those
used by the rm and present results from a eld implementation of the bids. We extend
the myopic policy in Section 6 to incorporate interdependence between keywords. Finally,
we discuss some limitations of our work in Section 7 and conclude in Section 8.
3.2. Literature review
In this section, we review three streams of active research within the eld of sponsored
search with a particular emphasis on prior work on bidding in sponsored search.
Mechanism Design: Search engines run PPC auctions in which they charge advertisers
whenever a consumer clicks on an ad.1 A primary area of focus in sponsored search research
has been the design of the auction mechanism. Two important questions from a mechanism
design perspective are the rules used to rank order the ads and the rules used to determine
the amount paid by advertisers. Feng et al. (2006) compare the performance of various
ad ranking mechanisms and nd that a yield-optimized auction, that ranks ads based on
the product of the submitted bid and ad relevance, provides the highest revenue to the
search engine. In terms of payment rules, Edelman and Ostrovsky (2007) study rst price
1Other payment rules are also feasible. These include Pay Per Action (PPA) auctions in which advertisers
are charged only if the consumer performs a valid action such as a purchase. Hybrid schemes are also feasible.
For example, in the context of banner ads, Kumar et al. (2007) propose a hybrid pricing model based on a
combination of ad impressions and clicks.
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sponsored search auctions in which advertisers pay the amount they bid and nd empirical
evidence of bidding cycles in such auctions. The authors indicate that a VCG-based mech-
anism eliminates such bidding cycles and generates higher revenues for the search engine
compared to the rst price auction. In a related paper, Edelman et al. (2007) demonstrate
that the commonly used GSP auction, unlike Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, is
not incentive compatible. Thus, advertisers have to bid strategically even in the absence of
budget constraints. Aggarwal et al. (2006) propose a \laddered" auction mechanism that
is incentive compatible but the mechanism has not been adopted possibly due to the com-
plexity of the payment rules. Mehta et al. (2007) solve the problem of matching ad slots to
advertisers using a generalization of the online bipartite matching problem. Given adver-
tisers' bids and budget constraints, Mehta et al. (2007) provide a deterministic algorithm
that achieves a competitive ratio of 1 1=e for this problem.2 Mahdian et al. (2007) extend
this work and provide a solution which is nearly optimal when the frequencies of keywords
are accurately known and provides a good competitive ratio even when these estimates
are completely inaccurate. Aggarwal and Hartline (2006), on the other hand, model this
problem as a knapsack auction. However, they consider only truthful mechanism designs
and analyze various pricing schemes and the payos under each of these pricing schemes.
Most of the above referenced papers focus on the search engine's problem and analyze how
dierent mechanisms aect the search engine's revenues.
Consumer behavior in sponsored search: The sponsored search environment presents
rich data on consumer behavior. Modeling user's propensity to click on ads and to pur-
chase upon clicking is an important area of recent focus. Several approaches have been
proposed to model clicks for individual keywords and ads (Ali and Scarr, 2007; Craswell
et al., 2008; Feng et al., 2006). Ali and Scarr (2007) compare several distributions to pre-
dict click-through rates and suggest that Pareto-Zipf distribution is the most appropriate
for explaining CTR as a function of position. Feng et al. (2006) alternately assume an
exponential decay in CTR with position and demonstrate that the model ts observed data
2Competitive ratio is the measure for comparing online algorithms to oine algorithms where all the
information is known apriori.
55
well. Several other papers build richer models of consumer behavior incorporating the eect
that ad attributes have on click-through and conversion (Ghose and Yang, 2009; Yang and
Ghose, 2010; Rutz et al., 2012; Agarwal et al., 2011). Rutz et al. (2012) propose a model
that measures the interaction between keywords and show that there are signicant positive
spillovers from generic keywords to branded keywords in consumer search.
Optimal Bidding in Sponsored Search: The stream of work closely related to our
paper is that on budget constrained bidding in sponsored search. Rusmevichientong and
Williamson (2006) propose a model for selecting keywords from a large pool of candidates.
Their model does not however address optimal bidding for these keywords and ignores the
multi-slot context. Feldman et al. (2007) study the bid optimization problem and indicate
that randomizing between two uniform strategies that bid equally on all keywords works
well. The authors assume that all clicks have the same value independent of the keyword.
Further, their results are derived in a deterministic setting where the advertisers position,
clicks and the cost associated with a bid are known precisely. Borgs et al. (2007) propose
a bidding heuristic that sets the same average Return on Investment (RoI) across all key-
words. Their model is also derived for a deterministic setting. Finally, Muthukrishnan et al.
(2007) study bidding in a stochastic environment where there is uncertainty in the number
of queries for any keyword. The authors focus on a single slot auction and nd that prex
bidding strategies that bid on the cheapest keywords work well in many cases. However,
they nd that the strategies for single slot auctions do not always extend to multi-slot auc-
tions and that many cases are NP hard .
The prior work reveals three themes. The rst is that the literature on sponsored search
mechanism design has established that GSP auctions are not incentive compatible. This
feature combined with the advertiser's budget constraint suggests a need to develop bidding
policies. Secondly, the empirical work in sponsored search provides a variety of useful models
that can be applied towards modeling consumer click behavior and the bidding behavior of
advertisers. These can ultimately be used to develop data-driven optimization strategies.
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Three, the issue of budget constrained bidding has received some attention. While these
early papers on bid optimization have helped advance the literature, they tend to focus on
deterministic settings or single slot auctions, both of which are restrictive assumptions in the
sponsored search context. None of these papers account for any interdependence in keyword
performance. Further, these papers develop heuristic strategies due to the complexity of
the optimization problem. In contrast, we determine optimal bids in a budget-constrained
multi-unit multi-slot auction under uncertainty in the decision-making environment. We
also extend our basic model to incorporate interaction between keywords.
3.3. Analytical Model
Advertisers usually maintain a portfolio of thousands of keywords for a particular search
engine. They submit bids for each keyword on a regular basis during a billing cycle. During
each time period when bids need to be computed, the bid management system accepts a
budget for that time period as an input and computes the bids for all keywords. We adopt
the same framework and focus on the bid optimization problem during a specic time period
in which the budget and the set of keywords have been specied.3 Although we consider
the advertiser's problem of optimizing the bid for a particular search engine in this paper,
our approach can be extended to multiple search engines by treating each keyword-search
engine pair as a unique keyword.
Ads placed in response to consumer search queries can play two roles for advertisers. They
can help generate purchases. Or they can help build awareness, which may translate into
purchases in later periods. Consumers often start their search process with generic search
terms e.g. \llet mignon". Bidding on these generic keywords might help the advertiser gen-
erate brand-specic (or retailer-specic) exposure. This in turn might enhance the aware-
ness of a particular brand and can lead to increased branded search activity (\spillover").
3A common practice in the SEM industry is to use Daily Budget = (Remaining Balance)/(Number of
days left in cycle), where remaining balance is the initial monthly budget less the amount spent thus far. We
do not focus on how the budget for a given time period is computed and treat it as an exogenous parameter
in our formulation.
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There is evidence of spillovers from generic to branded keywords in sponsored search ads
(Rutz et al., 2012).
In this section, we ignore spillovers between keywords and assume keywords are indepen-
dent. We propose a \myopic" bidding policy that solves the one-shot decision problem
of the advertiser and does not factor in indirect benets from keywords such as aware-
ness. We relax this assumption in Section 6 and incorporate interactions between keywords.
The bidding policy that incorporates interactions between keywords is referred to as the
\forward-looking" policy. The forward-looking policy solves the advertising problem in a
multi-period context. The motivation for developing two bidding policies is twofold. First,
the myopic policy is easier to implement and also relevant in the context of commoditized
products where branding is not very relevant. The complexity of a forward-looking policy
may be unnecessary for many advertisers. In addition, the forward-looking policy builds on
the myopic policy and it is useful for the purpose of exposition to outline the myopic policy
rst.
3.3.1. Notation and Setup
In this section we introduce our notation and the general framework used to study the
advertiser's decision problem.
During a given time period (say a day) a keyword k is searched Sk times, where Sk is
a random variable. Sk also represents the total number of impressions, i.e. the number
of times the advertiser's ad is displayed by the search engine. The expected number of
impressions is dened as k = E[Sk]. We denote the bid of the advertiser for the keyword
as bk, and assume that the advertiser does not change the bid during the day. Every
time the keyphrase is searched, the advertiser's ad is placed at some position in the list
of all sponsored results. Let pos
(s)
k be the position at which the ad was shown in the s
th
search, with the topmost position denoted position 0. Let 
(s)
k be an indicator of whether
a person who was searching for the keyword clicked on the advertiser's link, or not: 
(s)
k =
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I

click
(s)
k

.
The advertiser's value from a click is denoted by an independent random variable wk. We
assume that the precise value from a click is not known a priori but that it's expected
value E[wk] is known and equals Ewk. In Section 5, we discuss how Ewk is estimated from
historical data. v
(s)
k denotes the advertiser's value from the s
th impression. v
(s)
k = 
(s)
k wk,
i.e. it equals wk if the user clicks on the ad or 0 otherwise. Let b
(s)
k be the advertiser's cost
per click i.e. the bid of the advertiser at the next position pos
(s)
k + 1. The cost associated
with impression s may then be expressed as c
(s)
k = 
(s)
k b
(s)
k .
4 Because consumers do not know
the bids placed by advertisers, it seems reasonable to assume that given an ad's position
in the list, the probability that a person clicks on the ad does not depend on the bid of
the next advertiser. That is, conditional on the position pos
(i)
k , the vector

b
(i)
k ; 
(i)
k

has
independent components. We also assume that Sk is independent of other variables.
Besides the advertiser, there are Nk other advertisers who place their bids for keyword
k. We assume that Nk is known to the advertiser. It can be observed, for example, by
submitting sample queries to the search engine and observing the number of ads displayed.
We note that the number of competitors may in reality vary a bit from one impression to
another due to advertiser budget constraints, but we do not observe signicant variation
in this to warrant a random treatment for Nk.
5 The bids of the competitors cannot be
directly observed because the auction is a sealed bid auction. The key assumption we make
is that the competitors place their bids according to some distribution Fk (:) and this does
not change during the estimation period. The bids of competing advertisers are based on
two factors - their intrinsic valuations for a click and their competitive responses in the GSP
auction. We assume that there is an underlying valuation distribution (for clicks) which
4The discussion assumes that ads are ordered by bid and that the advertiser pays the bid of the next
advertiser. A common practice is to use the product of bid and a quality score to rank order the advertisers,
and the payment is the minimum bid needed to secure the position (e.g. the payment per click for an
advertiser in position i is bid(i+1)Quality(i+1)=Quality(i). This does not aect our model. If we normalize
the bid of all competitors by the ratio of their quality score relative to our advertiser (NormalizedBid =
bid QualityCompetitor=QualityAdvertiser), our analysis can be interpreted as based on this normalized bid.
5The coecient of intra-day variation in Nk = 0:031 and the coecient of inter-day varation in Nk =
0:102.
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when combined with the advertisers' bidding strategies gives rise to the bid distribution
Fk (:).
6 Finally, D denotes the advertiser's budget in a given time period of interest. Table
7 summarizes our notation.
Table 7: Summary of notation
k Variable that indexes keywords
Sk Random variable denoting number of searches for keyword k
k Expected number of search for keyword k (E[Sk])
(s) Superscript to denote sth search
bk Bid for keyword k
pos
(s)
k Position for keyword k in s
th search. pos
(s)
k = 0 denotes the top position.

(s)
k Indicator variable for click on s
th search.
wk Random variable indicating value of a click
Ewk Expected value of a click on keyword k (E[wk])
v
(s)
k Value of the s
th search (v
(s)
k = 
(s)
k wk)
b
(s)
k The bid of the next advertiser
c
(s)
k The cost of the s
th search (c
(s)
k = 
(s)
k b
(s)
k )
Nk Number of competitors
Fk(:) Distribution of bids of competitors
D Advertiser's budget
3.3.2. Model Formulation
The advertiser faces the following decision problem:
max
fbkg
E
"X
k
SkX
s=1
v
(s)
k jbk
#
; s.t. E
"X
k
SkX
s=1
c
(s)
k jbk
#
 D: (3.1)
The objective is to determine bids bk in order to maximize the advertiser's expected rev-
enues. The constraint implies that the expected cost should be less than or equal to a budget
D. Note that the budget is not modeled as a hard constraint. This is a common format
in which budget constraint is specied by advertisers in the SEM industry, and reects an
objective function of the form maxfbkg E
hP
k
PSk
s=1(v
(s)
k   c(s)k )jbk
i
. Thus, the objective is
to maximize expected prot but the shadow price of ad dollars is specied in the form of a
6The proposed bids might change Fk(:), but for identication purposes we assume that this competitive
reaction is minimal in the short-term. Later in the paper, we discuss how the competitive reaction can be
factored in by re-estimating parameters periodically and updating bids.
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constraint on the expected cost. The optimization problem in Equation (3.1) always has a
solution as shown in Appendix A1 (All important proofs appear in the Appendix). Solving
the problem gives the following optimality condition
8k : d
dbk
E
"
SkX
s=1
v
(s)
k jbk
#
= 
d
dbk
E
"
SkX
s=1
c
(s)
k jbk
#
: (3.2)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier. The optimality condition states that at the optimal bids
the ratio of the marginal change in the advertiser's expected revenues over the marginal
change in the advertiser's expected cost should be constant across keywords. An alternative
way to interpret it is as follows. If we decrease the bid for keyphrase k0 by ", then the
expected cost will decrease by " ddbk0
E
PSk0
s=1
h
c
(s)
k0 jbk0
i
and, hence, we may increase the bid
for another keyphrase k by " ddbk0
E
PSk0
s=1
h
c
(s)
k0 jbk0
i
= ddbkE
PSk
s=1
h
c
(s)
k jbk
i
. In this case the
expected increase in prots will be
"
d
dbk
E
PSk
s=1
h
v
(s)
k jbk
i
d
dbk0
d
dbk
E
PSk
s=1
h
c
(s)
k jbk
i E Sk0X
s=1
h
c
(s)
k0 jbk0
i
  " d
dbk0
E
Sk0X
s=1
h
v
(s)
k0 jbk0
i
= 0:
We assume that consumer click behavior and competitor bidding behavior is i.i.d across ad
impressions during the given time period. Hence, in Expression (3:2) we may cancel the
sums over s. Therefore, the optimal vector of bids should satisfy the following condition:
8k : d
dbk
E [vkjbk] =  d
dbk
E [ckjbk] : (3.3)
3.3.3. Optimality Condition
It is hard to use the optimality condition (3.3) to compute the optimal bids. In order
to apply (3.3), the advertiser needs to compute E [vkjbk] and E [ckjbk] accounting for the
uncertainty in competing bids and consumer query and click behavior. In this section, we
express the optimality condition in terms of parameters that can be estimated. We assume
that the number of competitors Nk is known and is constant during the day. We can identify
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the number of competitors by performing a search on keyword k at a search engine.
Consider a specic keyword k . We tentatively drop the subscript k as we focus on an
individual keyword. In order to compute E [vjb], we need to identify the probability of
a click given the bid b, which in turn depends on the probability distribution of the ad
position. Given that the competing advertisers' bids are drawn from F (:); the probability
of being at position i conditional on a bid b is
Pr fpos = ijbg =
0B@ N
i
1CA (1  F (b))i F (b)N i : (3.4)
The position is determined by a Bernoulli process, where the probability that a competitor
bids more than b and is placed higher is equal to 1   F (b). Recollect that the positions
start from 0, i.e., the topmost ad has position pos = 0, and position i indicates that there
are i other advertisers ranked above. Feng, Bhargava and Pennock's (2007) analysis of
click-through data suggests that the probability that a user clicks on an ad in position pos
is
Pr f = 1jpos = ig = 
i
; (3.5)
where  and  are keyword specic constants.  represents the overall attractiveness of
the ad and  captures the impact of position on clicks. This functional form does not
explicitly consider a number of other factors, e.g. number of words in the keyword, whether
the advertiser appears in the organic results or not, presence of dominant competitors etc.,
that might aect CTR (Yao and Mela, 2011; Agarwal et al., 2011; Katona and Sarvary,
2010; Ghose and Yang, 2009). It focuses only on the impact of position on CTR because ad
position is the primary mechanism through which bid impacts CTR. However, the parameter
 captures the eect that ad/keyword-level attributes like the number of words in the
keyword etc. have on the overall attractiveness of the ad.  on the other hand captures the
change in CTR with respect to position, all other factors held constant, which is consistent
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with prior research (Katona and Sarvary, 2010; Ghose and Yang, 2009).7 This function also
assumes that consumer behavior is i.i.d and ignores heterogeneity across consumers. We
use this assumption not only for model tractability but also because search engines do not
provide user-level data on impressions and clicks. Several papers that focus on keyword-level
models, also assume i.i.d. consumer behavior (Agarwal et al., 2011; Yang and Ghose, 2010;
Ghose and Yang, 2009). Given that the consumers click in the aforementioned manner, the
probability of a click conditional on the bid b is given by
Pr f = 1jbg =
X
i
Pr f = 1jpos = igPr fpos = ijbg (3.6)
=
X
i

i
0B@ N
i
1CA (1  F (b))i F (b)N i
=  N (1 + (   1)F (b))N :
Proposition 1: The expected value of an impression is given by
E [vjb] = E [wjb] = Pr f = 1jbgE[w] =  N (1 + (   1)F (b))N Ew: (3.7)
It follows from Proposition 1 that
d
db
E [vjb] = N N (   1)f (b) (1 + (   1)F (b))N 1: (3.8)
We now derive an expression for E [cjb]. In order to do so, we need to characterize the
probability distribution function of the bid of the next advertiser in the list of sponsored
results. We rst derive some intermediate results.
Lemma 1: The distribution function of the bid of the next advertiser in the list conditional
7However, if the presence of a dominant competitor introduces discontinuities in how position aects CTR
(e.g., CTR depends on whether the advertiser is above or below the dominant competitor), the functional
form fails to capture the same.
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on the bid and the position is given by
F (bjb; pos = i) =

F (b)
F (b)
N i
: (3.9)
Applying,
F (bjb; pos = i;  = 1) = F (bjb; pos = i) =

F (b)
F (b)
N i
; (3.10)
we can derive the following lemma.
Lemma 2: The conditional distribution of the bid of the next advertiser conditional on
the bid and the fact that the ad was clicked is
F (bjb;  = 1) =
NX
i=0
F (bjb;  = 1; pos = i) Pr fpos = ijb;  = 1g (3.11)
=

1  F (b) + F (b)
1 + (   1)F (b)
N
:
When a user clicks on an ad, the advertiser has to pay the bid of the next advertiser in the
list. Applying Lemma 2 and Equation (3.6) gives us
Proposition 2: The expected cost of an impression is given by
E [cjb] = E [bjb] (3.12)
= E [bjb;  = 1]Pr f = 1jbg
=  N

b[1 + (   1)F (b)]N  
Z b
0
[1  F (b) + F (b)]Ndb

:
Using Proposition 2 we can derive that
dE[cjb]
db
= N Nf(b)
 
(   1)b[1 + (   1)F (b)]N 1 +
Z b
0
[1  F (b) + F (b)]N 1db
!
:(3.13)
Substituting Expressions (3:8) and (3:13) in Equation (3.3),
dE[vjb]
db
= 
dE[cjb]
db
;
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1
=
1
Ew
 
b+
R b
0 [1  F (b) + F (b)]N 1db
(   1)[1 + (   1)F (b)]N 1
!
:
Proposition 3: The optimality condition (expressed in terms of estimable parameters) is
8k : 1
Ewk
 
bk +
R bk
0 [1  Fk(bk) + kFk(b)]Nk 1db
(k   1)[1 + (k   1)F (bk)]Nk 1
!
= const: (3.14)
Proposition 4: A unique bid bk satises the optimality condition (Equation 3.14) for
keyword k when
k > 1 +
1
Fk(b)
"
fk(b)(Nk   1)
R b
0 [1  Fk(b) + kFk(x)]Nk 2dx
[1 + (k   1)Fk(b)]Nk 2   1
#
:
The optimality condition can be used in conjunction with the budget constraint to compute
the optimal bids. For several common distributions and a wide range of parameters, we
show in the appendix that the conditions for a unique bid (Proposition 4) are satised.
In order to compute the optimal bids, the following keyword-specic constants need to be
known: k (the click-through rate at the top position), k (rate at which CTR decays with
position), Ewk (expected revenue per-click (RPC)), Nk (number of competing bidders), and
Fk(:) (distribution of competing bids). We estimate these parameters using a real-world
dataset and illustrate how bids may be computed in Section 5. The optimal bids should
satisfy equation (3:14) and the budget constraint,
X
k
kE [ck] = D:
These conditions are sucient to compute bids. The budget constraint can be rewritten as
X
k
kk
 Nk
k

bk[1 + (k   1)Fk(bk)]Nk  
Z bk
0
[1  Fk(bk) + kFk(b)]Nkdb

= D: (3.15)
For a given const in Equation (3.15), we compute the bid that satises the equation for
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every keyword. Then we use Equation (3:15) to calculate the expected total cost for the
computed bids. If the expected cost is lower than D, we increase the constant, otherwise
we decrease it. The process repeats until the expected total cost is suciently close to the
budget.
3.4. Data Description
Our dataset is from a leading meat distributor that sells through company owned retail
stores as well as online and through mail-order catalogs. This rm bids on thousands of
keywords across several search engines and has a substantial online presence. Our dataset
consists of daily summary records for 247 keywords that the rm uses to advertise on Google.
The daily record for each keyword has the following elds,
(id; t; b; i; cl; avgcpc; avgpos)
where
id - Unique identier for each keyword
t - date
b - bid submitted by advertiser
i - number of impressions during the day
cl - number of clicks during the day
avgcpc - average cost per click on the day
avgpos- average position during the day
This dataset is representative of the the type of data available to advertisers in sponsored
search. Advertisers only get summary reports from search engines and do not usually
have information on clicks and position for each individual ad impression. We present the
summary statistics at the keyword-level for a three-month period (March 01-May 31, 2011)
prior to the eld implementation in Table 8.
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Table 8: Summary Statistics
Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Avg Bid 1.18 1.01 0.35 10.00
Avg CPC 0.73 0.59 0.00 4.42
Avg Pos 3.15 1.90 1.00 12.41
Impressions 5637.22 13106.39 1.00 98373.00
Clicks 48.37 86.76 0.00 593.00
CTR 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.60
Cost 45.95 95.11 0.00 747.43
Revenue 83.26 132.47 0.00 974.31
Gross Prot 37.31 140.78 -747.43 902.20
Avg RPC 4.33 14.30 0.00 158.96
The mean average bid across all keywords during this period is $1.18 and the minimum and
maximum average bids for any keyword during this period is 35¢and $10, respectively. We
also observe that the mean average RPC is $4.33 where as the mean average CPC is 75¢,
however there is a huge variation in the protability across the keywords as indicated by
the large standard deviation in the average RPC. These 247 keywords belong to 29 unique
product categories which span frozen meats, sea foods and desserts. A comprehensive list
of these product categories appears in Table 9. We randomly divided these 29 product
categories into three distinct treatment groups. The bids for the rst group continued to be
controlled by the rm. This group forms the control group for our experiment. The other
two groups represent the two treated groups and their bids are determined by the myopic
bidding policy (Group I) outlined in Section 3 and the forward looking policy (Group II)
that we outline in Section 6. The control group is used to account for any time trends that
might enter the analysis due to seasonality in retail, search engine design changes and other
such factors. The three groups are fairly well matched in terms of impressions, clicks, cost
and revenues of their keywords. Summary statistics for the three groups are presented in
Table 10.
Our dataset is divided into three distinct periods as shown in Figure 8. The rst period
runs from March 1-May 31, 2011. This period forms the \before" period for our analysis
during which the bids for these 247 keywords were decided by the rm (summary statistics
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Table 9: Product Categories
Bacon Flat Iron Pork
Beef Gift Basket Porterhouse
Beef Jerky Gifts Prime Rib
Beef Sirloin Halibut Salmon
Burgers Ham Shrimp
Catsh Hot Dogs Sole
Cheesecake Lobster Surf and Turf
Corned Beef Lobster Bisque Swordsh
Crab London Broil Trout
Fillet Mignon Orange Roughy
Table 10: Summary for the three groups of keywords.
Control Group I Group II
Products Categories 8 10 11
Keywords 55 89 103
Impressions 7474.7 5336.1 4335.8
Clicks 66.6 52.2 30.6
Avg Bid 1.32 1.27 1.14
Avg CPC 0.84 0.91 0.74
Avg Pos 3.22 3.60 2.55
CTR 0.03 0.03 0.04
Avg RPC 4.80 5.36 4.35
for this period is in Table 8). During this period, there were 1.36 million impressions of the
ads for the 247 keywords and they received 11,651 clicks in total. The total weekly cost of
these ads was $964 and the weekly gross revenue generated from these keywords was $1728.
We use the data from this period to compute the expected value per-click (Ew) and the
expected daily impressions () for each keyword.
The second period spans July 1-July 31, 2011 which we refer to as the \estimation period"
for our analysis. We ignore the month of June from our analysis as there is a signicant
increase in online activity during this month due to Father's Day. The summary statistics
for this period is presented in Table 11. During the estimation period, we submit random
bids for the keywords in Groups I and II. The bids are uniformly drawn from $0:10 [1; 30]
resulting in a minimum bid of 10¢to a maximum bid of $3.00. The upper limit of $3.00 was
prescribed by the advertiser. The bids are drawn weekly which leads to four unique bids
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Figure 8: Illustration of the Timeline for the various data collection periods.
per keyword in the estimation period. This variation in bids leads to a signicant variation
in the ad position. The variation in position causes changes in the CTR and CPC and
helps the identication of the parameters of our model. The exact identication strategy
is discussed in Section 5. We also observe that there is decrease in the protability of the
campaign during this period as the bids for keywords in Group I and Group II are chosen
randomly.
Table 11: Summary Statistics for the Random Bidding Period
Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Bid 1.01 0.93 0.05 3.00
Avg CPC 0.77 0.58 0.00 2.89
Avg Pos 2.96 1.87 1.00 11.08
Impressions 2100.45 5115.73 1.00 43498.00
Clicks 19.00 35.78 0.00 277.00
CTR 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.50
Cost 18.29 38.51 0.00 278.97
Revenue 23.46 75.65 0.00 586.92
Gross Prot 5.18 67.51 -150.43 541.22
RPC 1.28 4.31 0.00 29.32
Finally, optimal bids are computed based on estimated parameters and deployed by the rm
between August 21 and September 21, 2011. Data from the after period is used to assess
the eectiveness of the bidding policies proposed in this paper. In Section 5, we discuss
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the estimation of parameters using data from the \estimation period". Subsequently, we
discuss the results from the eld implementation of the myopic policy.
3.5. Empirical Analysis
We now apply our technique to a real-world dataset of clicks and costs for several keywords
and derive the optimal bids for these keywords. We then describe the results from a eld
implementation of the suggested bids.
3.5.1. Estimation Approach
Our data provide daily summary measures (average position, average cost per click, total
clicks) but not the outcome of each individual impression. Given just these daily summary
measures, it is hard to apply regression or Maximum Likelihood Estimation techniques
directly on the aggregated data, hence we use the Generalized Methods of Moment (GMM)
approach to estimate these parameters. Following the idea of the method of moments, we
derive analytical expressions for the moments we observe empirically, namely, the expected
position (avgpost), cost per click (avgcpct) and click-through rate (ctrt = clt=it) given the
bid for each keyword. These moments are as follows:
E [postjbt] = Nt (1  F (bt)) ; (3.16)
E [btjbt; t = 1] =
Z
x<bt
x d

1  F (bt) + F (x)
1  (1  )F (bt)
Nt
; (3.17)
E [tjbt] =  Nt (1  (1  )F (bt))Nt : (3.18)
The observed moments can be expressed in terms of the analytical moments as follows:
avgpost = E [postjbt] + 1t;
avgcpct = E [btjbt; t = 1] + 2t;
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ctrt = E [tjbt] + 3t;
where t = (1t; 2t; 3t)
0 are the random shocks. As the dataset contains only daily ag-
gregates, we cannot directly estimate the distribution function F (:) using nonparametric
approaches since we have very few bids for each keyword. We therefore use a parametric
form for F (:), and estimate its parameters using the rst moments associated with the posi-
tion, cost per click and click-through rate. For the parametric form of the distribution F (:)
we choose the Weibull distribution. This choice is based on two factors. Firstly, the Weibull
distribution can take on diverse shapes and oers a great deal of exibility. Secondly, an
analysis of a secondary dataset of bids submitted to a search engine for several keywords
in the insurance sector (Abhishek et al., 2011) shows that the Weibull distribution is rea-
sonably good for modeling the bids.8 Note that we are not assuming that the distribution
of bids for keywords is the same across the two datasets, rather the bids are from the same
family (Weibull) and the parameters can vary across keywords. The Weibull distribution
has the following cumulative distribution function
F (x; ; ) = 1  exp

 
x


:
It is dened by two parameters  and . Therefore, we have four unknown parameters for
any keyword (; ; ; ) and 3 moment conditions for every unique bid.
The estimates of the parameter  = (; ; ; ) is given by
^ = argmin
2B
()0W();
where () is a vector of error between the observed and computed moments for a particular
keyword during the observation period and W is a weighting matrix. The choice of W is
critical as it determines the asymptotic properties of the estimator. Hansen et al. (1996) and
8The authors test several distributions such as Normal, Log-Normal, Gamma, Exponential and Logit but
the Weibull distribution ts their data the best. Note however that our framework is exible enough and
other distribution can be easily accommodated.
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Wooldridge (2001) suggest that the optimal weighting matrix is given by E[()0()] 1.
As we do not know E[()0()], an iterative-GMM estimator is used (see Hansen et al.,
1996) wherein the weighting matrix is iteratively re-estimated till it converges.
In order to compute the optimal bids we also need to know Ew, the expected revenue
per-click. The expected revenue per-click is computed by taking the total revenues from
the keyword in the \before" period and dividing it by the total number of clicks for that
keyword in the same period. The advertiser attributes revenues from a purchase to the
keyword that generated the session in which the purchase was made. One drawback with
the approach is that it does not account for indirect benets such as awareness. As stated
above, we address that later in the paper.
3.5.2. Identication Strategy
The parameters of this model can be estimated if we have at least 2 unique bids per keyword
in the data. However, there are two important reasons why data from the \before" period
cannot be used to estimate the parameters of this model - (i) insucient variation in bids,
and (ii) potential endogeneity in advertiser's bids.
Limited Variation in Bids
In typical SSA campaigns advertisers change their bids infrequently, sometimes once in
several months. Hence it is dicult to identify the parameters of the model. In our dataset,
there are very few changes in the bids for the keywords and the average number of unique
bids per keyword are 1.12. Because our model is under-identied with less than two unique
bids, we use the period of random bidding to generate random bids which would lead to
sucient variability in the bids drawn for a particular keyword across days.
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Endogeneity of Bids
The second concern with using historical data is the potential endogeneity of bids. In order
for the GMM to provide consistent estimate we require that E[b] = 0 or the bids and the
random shock are independent of each other. However, the rm might increase the bid for a
particular keyword if there is a random increase in demand, e.g. on a sunny weekend. These
random shocks are observed by the advertisers but we as researchers are not aware of them.
Since the rm is bidding strategically, it is very likely that the bids for a particular keyword
are correlated with these random shock in the before period. We address this endogeneity
issue by using random bids in the estimation period. This randomization of bids ensures
that they are independent of the random shocks.
We also require that the distribution F (:) does not change during the estimation period
as competitive response to the random bids being set during this period. This seems like
a reasonable assumption given the muted short-term competitive response in sponsored
search as pointed out by Rutz et al. (2012). We revisit this assumption in Section 7.2.
3.5.3. Estimation Details and Results
In order to estimate the parameters, a nonlinear solver is used in our implementation.9 The
parameter estimates for a few representative keywords are shown in Table 12. N represents
the mean number of daily competitive ads in the observation period. For brevity, we plot
the distribution of the estimated parameters for all keywords in Groups I and II in Figure
9. A complete table is available from the authors upon request.
Although there is signicant heterogeneity across keywords, the estimated parameter values
are fairly typical in sponsored search. The mean click-through rate () at the topmost
position is 0.026 and the mean decay parameter () is 1.68 which is similar to the values
reported earlier (Feng et al., 2006; Craswell et al., 2008). There is also considerable variation
in the expected revenue per-click (Ew) and the bid distributions (;) across keywords.
9We use the Fletcher-Xu hybrid method provided as a part of the ClsSolve routine in TOMLAB.
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Table 12: Parameter estimates for a sample subset of keywords.
keyword     N Ew($)
beef sirloin steak 1.7651 0.5351 0.0266 2.1237 9.5 0.00
(0.4927) (0.2821) (0.0115) (0.2742)
Steak Burger 0.6697 2.1944 0.0069 1.2915 5.1 1.53
(0.4035) (0.3731) (0.0008) (0.0902)
cheesecakes 0.9736 1.3265 0.0004 1.6091 7.0 1.08
(0.2064) (0.4270) (0.0000) (0.2405)
Porterhouse Steak 1.1413 0.8639 0.0085 1.1661 4.6 0.43
(0.5118) (0.1821) (0.0015) (0.3711)
smoke salmon 1.3414 1.1752 0.0073 1.0255 10.1 6.62
(0.5429) (0.4520) (0.0012) (0.3989)
corned beef 1.5368 0.7492 0.0018 1.0175 10.7 3.80
(0.8126) (0.5781) (0.0004) (0.7045)
hot dog order 1.0769 1.0869 0.0101 1.6486 7.3 3.00
(0.4410) (0.7503) (0.0036) (0.2446)
birthday gifts 1.1756 0.8420 0.0009 1.0659 40.2 5.74
(0.6781) (0.4176) (0.0000) (0.7850)
birthday present 0.7524 1.3841 0.0122 1.0434 7.1 0.45
(0.6721) (0.4816) (0.0057) (0.9381)
lobster bisque 1.311 1.0074 0.0145 1.9293 11.3 0.00
(0.3928) (0.5025) (0.0037) (0.4117)
3.5.4. Field Implementation
Once we estimate parameters ; ;  and  for all keywords, we estimate the optimal bids
for these keywords. In this section we focus on the myopic policy outlined in Section 3 and
discuss the results of the eld implementation for keywords in Group I.
For the keywords in Group I, we use a daily budget D = $72:00 based on the mean weekly
spend of around $500 during the 3 month \before" period. The bids are recomputed after
two weeks when we re-estimate the parameters (; ; ; ) using newly available data. The
bids are recomputed to account for changes in competitor bids and consumer click behavior.
However, the bids do not change much during this re-computation. Bids for a sample of
keywords are below in Table 13.
The rationale for these bids can be inferred from the parameters listed in Table 12. Consider,
for example, bids for keywords \smoke salmon", \hot dogs order" and \birthday gifts". Our
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Figure 9: Distribution of estimated parameters across keywords.
algorithm suggests increasing their bids. From Table 12, we observe that their expected
value per click (Ew) is high and it makes sense that the algorithm is suggesting that we
increase their bids. Interestingly, the keyword \birthday gifts" has a very high Ew, yet its
bid is not raised by a signicant amount. This is because the keyword is very expensive
(low ) and it is very dicult to attain the top position. There are other keywords where
it is worthwhile to spend the advertising dollars. This policy also decreases the bids for
keywords like \beef sirloin steak", \lobster bisque" and \birthday present". The bids for
\beef sirloin steak" and \lobster bisque" are decreased because they are not protable. The
bid for \birthday present" is decreased because (i) it is not very protable and (ii) it is
possible to get a similar number of clicks at a lower position (low ) for much cheaper.
The suggested bids were deployed in the eld by the advertiser for a period of 4 weeks.
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Table 13: Parameter estimates for a sample subset of keywords.
keyword Old Bids ($) New Bids ($)
beef sirloin steak 0.82 0.00
Steak Burger 2.19 0.95
cheesecakes 0.66 0.70
Porterhouse Steak 0.76 0.30
smoke salmon 1.16 2.55
corned beef 0.31 3.00
hot dogs order 0.76 1.85
birthday gifts 0.96 1.75
birthday present 1.61 0.20
lobster bisque 0.46 0.00
During the 12 weeks in the \before" period, the rm spent a total of $5937.58 on the
keywords in Group I and obtained revenues of $9776.10. In the \after" period, the total cost
and total revenues associated with the keywords were $3178.82 and $4594.43 respectively.
In the same period, the total cost (revenues) associated with the control keywords was
$4701.52 ($9776.2) and $1667.54 ($1480.80), respectively. We use a Dierence-in-Dierence
approach to compute the eect of our algorithm. The improvement in performance due to
the algorithm is given by
M = ROIGroup I  ROIControl
= (44:53%  64:65%)  ( 11:20%  84:30%)
= 75:38%
The performance of the advertising campaign increases by 75.38% on a DiD basis indicating
that the myopic policy outperforms the advertisers bidding policy. In the next section we
discuss some of the drivers of this performance gain. Surprisingly, we notice that there is
an absolute decrease in the ROI in the campaign compared to the \before" time period
and this decrease is particularly notable for the Control group. This is partly because of
seasonality in meat sales. In addition, there were changes in the manner in which the search
engine displayed search results. From July onwards, the search engine started highlighting
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the top ads by using a light pink background color, which resulted in an increase in the
CTR of the top ads.10 For the Control group we see an increase in the CTR from 0.89% to
1.4% and for the keywords in Group II we see a change from 1.04% to 1.15%. We observed
that this not only resulted in an increased CTR for the keywords, but also a decrease
in their performance during this time. This change negatively aects the performance of
our policy as the underlying parameters that were used to compute the optimal bids have
changed. However, the control group allows us to control for such changes in the search
engine policy. Since the keywords in the Control Group and Group I are matched as a
result of the randomization procedure, the change in the display scheme has the same eect
(on average) on the keywords in either groups. Hence, the DiD approach eliminates the
inuence of the policy change and measure the dierence in performance between the myopic
policy and the policy adopted by our partner advertiser. It should be noted that, although
the parameters of the model are recomputed during the experiment, the estimates did not
capture the changes in the CTR. Since the data during the eld experiment (1.5 week) were
pooled with data from the estimation period (4 weeks), the changes during the experiment
did not have a signicant impact on the parameter estimates.
3.5.5. Analysis of the Field Experiment
In the previous section we presented the improvement that the myopic policy oers over the
advertiser's policy. In this section, we discuss in further detail the factors that lead to the
improvement in the campaign's performance. There are two main sources of improvement {
Firstly, a comprehensive model that captures the eect of bid on position, position on CTR
and eventually the bid on vk and ck, helps us in improving the bids for each keywords. Sec-
ondly, since bids for the entire portfolio are determined jointly, the advertising budget can
be distributed from less protable keywords to relatively more protable keywords (based
on on the aforementioned model). As both these approaches are concurrently applied to
10Several analysts suggest that the pink background for the ads is indistinguishable from the page back-
ground and users mistake these ads for organic links.
http://www.plymarketing.com/ppc/6-reasons-googles-new-ad-layout-should-really-piss-you-o/
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the portfolio, it is dicult to disentangle the eect of these drivers on the campaign perfor-
mance. However, we demonstrate how both these decisions aect the bids and protability
of keywords in the campaign. The following table contains a list of sample keywords and
their performance in during the eld experiment.
Table 14: Changes in keyword performance
keyword Avg RPC($) Old bids($) New bids($) Avg CPC Gross Prot
buy orange roughy 2.95 0.35 0.85 0.29 343.33
let mignon 5.00 1.50 2.55 1.83 210.37
buy lobster online 3.92 1.91 2.35 1.86 148.19
smoked salmon lox 5.85 1.00 3.00 2.03 38.24
bbq Beef 3.83 1.52 1.00 0.96 42.56
lobster delivery 1.62 2.25 0.95 0.87 -1.310
precooked bacon 1.57 1.50 1.05 0.68 -38.73
birthday gifts 5.74 0.96 1.75 1.73 -204.92
From the sample presented in Table 14 we observe that the advertiser was initially placing a
much lower bids for keywords like \buy orange roughy", \let mignon" etc. These keywords
are not only very protable (have a high RPC), they are considerably cheap (have a lower
CPC) as they do not face intense competition. Using the analytical model presented in
Section 3, we can ascertain not only the consumer response parameter (CTR v/s position)
but also the competitive landscape associated with a keyword, which are subsequently in-
corporated in the bidding process. E.g. since there is very little competition for \buy orange
roughy", the myopic policy recommends increasing the bid for this keyword. Even though
the bid has been increased signicantly, the CPC in the \after" period is considerably low
(29¢), which further validates the low level of competition for this keyword. Interestingly,
the policy reduces the bid for \bbq Beef". This decay in the CTR with position is very
low for this keyword ( = 1:0338), hence the policy choses a smaller bid to decrease the
costs without aecting the revenues considerably. This complex interaction between the
bid, the revenue and the cost associated with a keyword cannot be predicted in a modeless
manner. Our approach explictly captures the relationship between these variable and hence
outperforms the heurtistics adopted by our partner advertiser.
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We also observe that the bids for several moderately protable keywords like \lobster
delivery" and \precooked bacon" have been reduced in the after period. The joint bid-
optimization reduces the bids for these keywords as the budget invested in these keywords
can be diverted to keywords that deliver higher prots. Since their bids are decreased,
their position drops and hence they lead to fewer clicks. As a result they generate much
less revenue and their gross prots are lower during the eld experiment as compared to
the \before" period. It should be noted that this decrease in prots is compensated for
by the investment in relatively more protable keywords. In summary, the myopic policy
focuses on relatively cheap and protable keywords and reduces the bids of other keywords
to maximize the prots from these keywords. Surprising, we see that the gross prots for
\birthday gifts", a high performing keyword in the \before" period, decrease considerably
during the eld experiment. The myopic policy increases the bid for \birthday gifts" given
its high RPC. However, as the CTR increase signicantly during the eld experiment (due
to the changes by the search engine), the value per impression vk drops considerably and
this keyword incurs a loss.
3.6. Incorporating Interdependence between Keywords
The preceding discussion assumes that keywords are independent of each other and the
consumer click behavior is i.i.d.. In reality, consumers may search across several keywords
before making a purchase decision and this might lead to interaction between keywords. For
example, a consumer might begin his search with a generic keyword like \llet mignon" but
may eventually purchase using another keyword such as \Walmart llet mignon". While
searching for llet mignon, he could have been exposed to ads from Walmart, causing
Walmart to be part of his consideration set. Not accounting for such spillovers may cause
the advertiser to undervalue \llet mignon" and overvalue \Walmart llet mignon". This
example illustrates that there is value in accounting for these interactions while making
bidding decisions. One way to capture this interaction is a full factorial design, where we
consider spillovers for every possible subset of the portfolio of keywords and decide the
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optimal bids for keywords in this subset. However, the problem is NP hard and requires
signicant resources to assess the performance of each subset. In this paper we will focus
on a specic kind of interaction proposed by Rutz et al. (2012). We categorize the keywords
into two groups { generic and branded { and explore how these two groups of keywords
interact.
A generic keyword does not contain the brand name of the rm (e.g. \llet mignon")
whereas a branded keyword does (e.g. \Walmart llet mignon"). Advertising on generic
keywords can help create awareness about the brand/product which can then increase the
likelihood that the brand is a part of the consumer's consideration set and, in turn, result
in greater number of branded searches. Rutz et al. (2012) show that there are considerable
spillovers from generic to branded search activity in sponsored search. Methods which do
not account for awareness might undervalue some keywords. E.g., in our dataset, clicks
on generic keywords are usually more expensive than on branded keywords (e.g., $0.88 v/s
$0.45) and less protable (e.g., $2.89 v/s $7.80). If we just look at the RPC and CPC of
the keywords, it is more protable to invest in branded keywords as compared to generic
keywords. However, as pointed out earlier, bidding on expensive generic keywords might
lead to future branded search and more clicks on the protable branded keywords. Hence,
the advertiser should incorporate this spillover eect while making his bidding decisions.
In the following discussion we present a model that accounts for this dynamic interaction
between the generic and branded keywords while computing optimal bids.
3.6.1. Measuring Interactions
In order to incorporate the spillover eect in our decision model we rst need to estimate
the changes in awareness due to search activity and its eect on future search activity. We
use the Nerlove-Arrow model (Rutz et al., 2012; Naik and Sawyer, 1998; Nerlove and Arrow,
1962) to capture the evolution of awareness
dAt
dt
=  (1  A)At + Xt; (3.19)
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where At refers to the awareness level at time t, (1  A) measures the decay of awareness
with time, Xt is a vector of covariates that capture the search activity at time t and 
captures the extent to which dierent kinds of search activity aect the level of awareness.
According to the Nerlove-Arrow model, brand awareness decays over time since consumers
forget about a brand as time goes by. Search activity, on the other hand, reinforces brand
awareness. This increased awareness, in turn, can lead to further branded search activity.
We divide the keywords into two groups { G (generic) and B (branded) { and explore how
search activity related to these keywords aects the level of awareness. The two search
activities that we observe in our dataset are impressions and clicks for each keyword in
the campaign. Prior results suggest that ad impressions do not have a signicant impact
on brand awareness but clicks on ads increase brand awareness (Rutz et al., 2012). This
is because an ad impression does not guarantee that the ad is seen by the consumer and,
further, mere exposure to an ad may not have an impact on the consumer unless the
consumer pays sucient attention to the ad (e.g., by clicking it). We incorporate this nding
in our model and assume that generic and branded clicks may increase brand awareness
(which is latent in our model and cannot be directly observed). An increase in this latent
awareness can lead to more search and hence more generic or branded impressions.11 This
interaction is demonstrated in Figure 10.
Figure 10: Interaction between search activity and latent awareness.
We rst describe how generic and branded clicks aect awareness. The total number of
11We validate this assumption in our dataset by performing a Granger causality test and infer that
impressions (both generic and branded) do not lead to more clicks but generic clicks lead to more branded
impressions.
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generic and branded clicks at time t are dened as CLKGt =
P
k2G clk;t and CLK
B
t =P
k2B clk;t, respectively. As we only observe daily data, we use a discrete time analogue of
the model presented in Equation (3.19),
At+1 = AAt + GCLK
G
t + BCLK
B
t + "
A
t+1; (3.20)
where A captures the carry-over rate of awareness and "
A
t+1 is the idiosyncratic error term.
Like Rutz and Bucklin (2010), we assume that the awareness at time t + 1 is aected by
the generic search activity at time t but in addition we allow for branded search activity
to also impact awareness. As highlighted earlier, awareness is not observed in the data and
is latent in this state-space model. Next, we outline how awareness aects both generic
and branded search activity. In our model, we assume that awareness only aects the
consumer's propensity to search but it has no eect on the consumer behavior after the
search is executed. This implies that awareness aects the number of impressions (queries)
but has no impact on the click-through or conversion rates. This assumption is in keeping
with the ndings of Rutz et al. (2012) who show that awareness does not have a statistically
signicant impact on click through and conversion rates. The expected number of generic
impressions at time t is dened as Gt =
P
k2G k;t and the expected number of branded
impressions at time t is dened as Bt =
P
k2B k;t, where k;t are the expected number
of impressions for keyword k at time t. The expected number of generic and branded
impressions evolve with awareness in the following manner,
Gt+1 = G
G
t + 
GAt+1 + "
G
t+1; (3.21)
Bt+1 = B
B
t + 
BAt+1 + "
B
t+1: (3.22)
It should be noted that the eect of awareness is computed from aggregate data (not
individually for each pair of generic/branded keyword).12 In order to have a parsimonious
12One can conduct this analysis at a generic-branded keyword-pair level or a product level if there is
sucient data and variation in that data. Our dataset is very sparse to get statistical signicance at
keyword-pair or product level.
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model we assume that the eect of awareness is homogeneous across all branded keywords.
Similarly, the eect across generic keywords is homogeneous.
Combining Equations (3.20)-(3.22), we get a state space model whose evolution is as follows
266664
Gt+1
Bt+1
At+1
377775 =
266664
G G
B B
A
377775
266664
Gt
Bt
At
377775+
266664
G B
377775
264 CLKGt
CLKBt
375+
266664
"Gt+1
"Bt+1
"At+1
377775 (3.23)
where the correlated error terms ":::t+1 account for random shocks and "  N(0; V"). The
following equation represents how these latent states are linked to the observations,
264 IMPGt+1
IMPBt+1
375 =
264 1 0 0
0 1 0
375
266664
Gt+1
Bt+1
At+1
377775+
264 Gt+1
Bt+1
375
where IMPGt+1 and IMP
B
t+1 are generic and branded impressions at time t + 1, 
:::
t+1 
N(0; V) is the random shock. We estimate this system of equations using a Dynamic Linear
Model (DLM). DLMs have been used in several situations where an important component
of the model is unobserved (Rutz et al., 2012; Bass et al., 2007; Naik and Sawyer, 1998).
We estimate this model using a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) approach as proposed
by West and Harrison (1997). Details of the estimation procedure are outlined in Appendix
A3. The variation in the number of impressions and clicks for generic and branded keywords
help us identify the parameters of the model. The estimated parameters of the model are
presented in Table 15.
First, we note that there is a strong positive impact of generic clicks on awareness (G > 0).
Second, increased awareness leads to increased branded search activity (B > 0). Com-
bining these results, we conclude that every click on a generic ad increases the number of
branded impressions by BG (= 0:38). We also observe that the eects of branded clicks
on awareness and of awareness on generic search activity are insignicant (B  0; G  0).
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Table 15: Estimated Parameters
Parameter Mean 95% Conf. Interval
G 0.9515 [0.9735, 0.9321]
B 0.8664 [0.8411, 0.8842]
A 0.2418 [0.2297, 0.2547]
G 0.0232 [-0.0006, 0.0427]
B 0.1088 [0.0997, 0.1132]
G 3.4018 [3.2656, 3.6123]
B 0.0208 [-0.0105, 0.0461]
The gures in bold are statistically signicant at the 95% level.
These ndings are consistent with the results reported by Rutz et al. (2012). It appears
reasonable that if a consumer is already aware of a brand, then clicking on a branded ad is
less likely to change his awareness about that brand. Similarly, awareness about a particular
brand does not aect consumer's generic search behavior.
We incorporate these estimates of spillovers into our decision theoretic model in the following
manner. Given the statistically insignicant estimates of B and G, we assume that only
generic clicks aect future search behavior and this eect is limited to branded searches.
We also assume that all generic clicks are identical and lead to the same relative increase
in the search (or impressions) for these branded keywords. More formally,
k;t+1 = Bk;t + k;BGCLKG;t 8 k 2 B; (3.24)
k;t+1 = Gk;t 8 k 2 G:
where k;B = B
k;t
G;t
is the increase in the expected impressions of keyword k 2 B at
time period t + 1 for every generic click at time t. The increased impressions for branded
keywords, which are usually more protable, leads to higher revenues in future periods.
3.6.2. Forward-Looking Policy
As discussed in the previous section, bidding on keywords has two eects - current period
revenues and future awareness. As a result, the advertiser faces a trade-o between max-
imizing current period revenues and increasing awareness (through more generic clicks) to
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increase revenues in the future. We consider the advertiser's problem of deciding the bids
for the keywords in each time period so as to maximize the total prots for a nite time
horizon. Lets denote the planning horizon by T . We assume that the budget in each time
period should be less than or equal to D. The multi-period bidding problem is as follows
max
fbtg
TX
t=1
r( t;
bt) s.t.
X
k
k;tck(bk;t)  D; t = 1; : : : ; T
where  t = (1;t; : : : K;t)
T is a vector of the expected number of impressions and bt is a
vector of bids for each keyword in period t. r( t;
bt), the expected current period prot,
is computed using the formula in Equation (3.1). For ease of exposition, we dene the ad
spend in time period t as C( t;
bt) =
P
k k;tck(bk;t). We formulate a nite horizon dynamic
program with T periods to solve this problem.
V (1; 1) = maxfbtg
TX
t=1
r( t;
bt) s.t. C( t;
bt)  D; t = 1; : : : ; T;
= max
b1 s.t. C(1;
b1)D
(
r(1;
b1) +
 
max
fbt s.t. C( t;bt)Dg
TX
t=2
r( t;
bt)
!)
;
= max
b1 s.t. C(1;
b1)D

r(1;
b1) + E[V (2; 2)]
	
;
where V (t;  t) is the value function at time t. More generally, the Bellman equation for
this problem is as follows
V (t;  t) = maxbt s.t. C( t;bt)D

r( t;
bt) + E[V (t+ 1;  t+1)]
	
:
, the vectors of mean impressions, constitute the state-space and the bids, b, are the
control variable. The state evolves in a manner shown earlier in Equation (3.24). As this
is a nite horizon problem, we use backward induction to solve for the optimal bids. At
t = T , the advertiser does not care about awareness and the optimal policy in the last stage
is to bid according to the \myopic" policy. In order to nd the optimal bids for t < T , we
use approximate dynamic programming. We assume that the expected number of generic
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clicks at time t belongs to the set CLK = f0; 1; : : : ;Mg, where M is an arbitrarily large
number.13 For every CLK 2 f0; 1; : : : ;Mg, we evaluate the subsequent state and optimal
revenues in period t + 1. We now solve the problem in Equation (3.1) with the additional
constraint that there are exactly CLK generic clicks in period t. This problem is stated as
follows
max
fbtg
X
k
k;tE [vk;tjbk;t] s.t. C( t; bt)  D and
X
k2G
k;tE [k;tjbk;t] = CLK:
The optimal policy in this period is to choose a CLK (and the associated bids, bt) that
maximize the sum of current reward and the optimal future rewards. For the eld experi-
ment, we update bids once every two weeks and there are T = 2 time periods in total. The
optimal bids under this forward-looking policy for some keywords are shown in Table 16
below. We also present the bids that would have been placed if we had used a myopic bid-
ding policy instead. The forward-looking policy increases the bids for some of the generic
keywords if they are likely to generate clicks. Accordingly, the bids for some of the less
protable branded keywords are reduced.
Table 16: Bids under the forward-looking policy
Keyword Ew($) Myopic Bids Forward-Looking Bids
buy barbecue 1.94 0.65 0.85
porterhouse steaks 5.50 2.30 2.40
lobster bisque 0.00 0.00 0.20
Nebraska beef 2.69 1.25 1.25
purchase hot dog 4.47 2.45 2.65
buy top sirloins online 0.00 0.00 0.05
trout llets 0.00 0.00 0.00
beef sirloin online 0.00 0.00 0.00
BRAND-NAME lobster bisque 6.43 2.45 2.15
BRAND-NAME steak burgers 14.59 3.00 3.00
13M = 200 in our analysis.
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3.6.3. Field Implementation
We apply the forward-looking policy to keywords in Group II. A daily budget D = $35.00 is
used based on the mean weekly spending of $250 during the 3 month \before" period. We
consider two time periods in our forward looking policy and compute the bids accordingly.
The bids computed for the rst period are deployed in the eld for a period of 2 weeks and
the bids computed for the second (last) period are deployed for two weeks thereafter.
During the 12 weeks in the \before" period, the advertiser incurred a cost of $3052.60
and earned revenues of $5646.03 for Group II keywords. In the \after" period the cost
and revenues were $1201.67 and $2075.43, respectively. Using the Dierence-in-Dierence
approach, as in Section 5.4, the improvement in performance is estimated to be
FL = ROIGroup II  ROIControl
= (72:71%  84:96%)  ( 11:20%  84:30%)
= 83:25%
There is a notable increase in the performance of Group II keywords relative to the control
group. Further, the forward-looking policy provides performance gains over and above that
delivered by the myopic policy (FL M = 7:87%). The eectiveness of the forward-looking
policy is likely to depend on prior brand awareness among search engine users and also on
the duration of the experiment. Thus, the gains may vary in other settings based on prior
brand awareness. We expect that the gains from the forward-looking policy will be greater
if the eld experiment is conducted over a longer duration. We were unable to experiment
for an extended period of time due to limitations imposed by our partner advertiser.
3.7. Discussion
In this section, we contrast our proposed approach with policies commonly used by adver-
tisers in sponsored search. Then we shall discuss some caveats to our models which might
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limit the applicability of our bidding policies.
3.7.1. Contrast with Commonly Used Strategies
Our agreement with the advertiser precludes sharing their exact bidding strategy. However,
their strategy is fairly typical of strategies used by most advertisers in sponsored search.
There are three main reasons why our policies perform better than the policies adopted by
these advertisers. Firstly, because of the complexity of bid determination, most advertisers
use simple heuristics to determine bids. One common heuristic is to simply raise bids for
keywords that generate purchases at a relatively low cost and to reduce bids for keywords
that do not generate purchases. While this is a reasonable heuristic, it does not account
for details of the bid distribution or how the CTR decays with position. For e.g., for some
keywords, reducing bids may reduce clicks signicantly but it may not have a signicant
impact on cost-per-click. Parameters tied to competing bids and click decay have a sig-
nicant impact on optimal bids. As shown in Table 13 it might not be optimal to invest
heavily in a protable but highly competitive ad (birthday gifts). Another challenge for
advertisers is that they often manage bids for keywords individually without optimizing
the portfolio as a whole. Raising and lowering bids for keywords in equal increments to
manage the budget constraint is suboptimal. Optimizing the bids over the entire portfolio
helps to move the advertising dollars from poorly performing keywords to protable ones
in the right increments. Thirdly, the forward-looking policy accounts for the two-fold eect
that sponsored search ads have - awareness and prots. By ignoring the awareness benets
of generic keywords, advertisers often under-invest in generic keywords and over-invest in
branded keywords.
3.7.2. Competitive Reaction
This paper adopts a decision-theoretic perspective of the bid problem as opposed to an
equilibrium perspective. Advertisers have to submit bids based on their current beliefs and
may choose to update these bids as their beliefs evolve. Our framework accommodates
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that by assuming that advertisers can use new data to re-estimate the model parameters
and update their bids. If competing advertisers respond instantaneously to changes in bids
then this may reduce the eectiveness of our bidding policies or at the very least suggest
that bids need to be rapidly and continuously updated. However, current research suggests
that competition in sponsored search advertising is fairly subdued (Rutz and Bucklin 2010,
Steenkamp et. al. 2005). Our discussions with several managers indicates that bids for
these keywords are rarely updated continuously. This is also reected in our dataset where
bids for less than 10% of the keywords were changed in the 12 week \before" period when
the advertiser was deciding the bids.
To test whether rapid reaction by competitors render our computed bids ineective, we
compare the dierence between the predicted and observed average (i) position and (ii)
cost per-click in the after period (presented earlier in Equations (3.16) and (3.18)). If com-
petitors react soon to our advertiser's new bids, it would introduce notable errors in our
predictions regarding the expected position and cost-per-clicks. For most of the keywords,
there is no signicant dierence between the predicted moments and the daily summaries
reported by the search engine, which indicates that there is no signicant short-term com-
petitive reaction.14 There can however be long-term competitive reaction and the model
parameters (; ; ; ) can be periodically re-estimated and the bids updated to account for
these changes. This estimation would not suer from endogeneity issues as long as the bids
are determined through the proposed algorithm and are uncorrelated with random shocks.
Since the issue of endogeneity no longer arises, there might not be a need for a random
bidding period.
3.7.3. Spillover across Groups
While computing the eectiveness of the \forward-looking" bidding policy in Section 6, we
implicitly assumed that there are no spillovers across groups. However, spillovers from key-
14The Mean Absolute Error (MAE) of these moments averaged across all keywords are shown in Table 17
in Appendix A2.
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words in one treatment group into keywords in another group might inuence the estimate
of FL. To control for this, we divide keywords into product categories and assign all key-
words from a product category into the same treatment group. This experimental design is
motivated by the intuition that clicks on keywords related to a particular product will not
have any impact on the search behavior for other products, e.g. while clicks for \hot dogs"
can spill over to branded keywords within the same product category \BRAND-NAME
hot dog", it will have insignicant impact on searches for \salmon" or \BRAND-NAME
salmon" . This procedure of random assignment by product categories helps ensure such
that most of the spillovers are within treatment groups. This experimental design is based
on Angelucci and Giorgi (2009) where they propose a methodology to measure treatment
eects with spillovers. Note that the random assignment of the product categories to groups
also ensures that even if there are some spillovers across groups, these eects are similar
between any given pair of groups. A more sophisticated way to incorporate the spillover
eect might be a multi-tier design as proposed by McConnell, Sinclair and Green (2010)
but this approach would severely aect the analytical tractability of our approach and has
been left as a direction for future research.
3.8. Conclusions
The presence of a large portfolio of keywords, multiple slots for each keyword and signif-
icant uncertainty in the decision environment make an advertiser's problem of bidding in
sponsored search a challenging optimization problem. In this paper, we formulated the
advertiser's decision problem and analytically derived the optimality condition. Our bid
optimization model addresses a major gap in prior work related to incorporating multiple
slots per item, uncertainty in competitor bidding behavior and consumer query and click
behavior. We illustrated the technique using a real-world dataset. A eld test suggests that
the approach can substantially boost advertiser's RoI. We extend our basic model to ac-
count for secondary eect of these ads - awareness - and show that incorporating awareness
into a multi-period bidding problem can help increase revenues further.
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There are a number of interesting avenues along which our work can be extended. We
discuss these below.
Exploration and Learning : Our analysis assumes that keyword-specic parameters are
known or can be easily estimated based on recent historical data. If there has been sucient
bid exploration in the recent history, these parameters can be estimated as demonstrated
in our empirical study. However, new keywords and keywords for which bids have settled
down into a relatively narrow range present a challenge. Thus an important area of oppor-
tunity to further extend our work is to combine optimization with a suitable exploration
technique. Exploration is clearly expensive but facilitates more accurate estimation of pa-
rameters. Heuristics proposed for Multi-armed Bandit and budget constrained Multi-armed
Bandit problems are particularly relevant for balancing exploration and exploitation.
Modeling Advertiser Heterogeneity : The key assumption we make in this paper is that
competitor bids are drawn from the same distribution. This allows us to keep the model
tractable and solve the complex stochastic optimization problem faced by an advertiser but
ignores heterogeneity among competitors. Modeling heterogeneity in advertisers' bidding
policies is an important next step for our research. Additionally, our focus in this paper,
like that of the stream of work on optimal bidding, is the operational bid determination
problem faced by an advertiser at any given instant rather than an economic analysis of the
long-term equilibrium that results from the bidding strategies of advertisers in a market.
Equilibrium analysis is another interesting direction, albeit a complex one in this setting
due to the presence of multiple keywords and a budget constraint.
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Appendix
Proofs of Equations and Propositions
Solution of Equation (3.1)
The constrained optimization problem is as follows
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Assuming the budget constraint is binding (i.e. > 0 ), then there exists an extremum s.t.
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> 0, there exists at least one local maxima, and it maxi-
mizes the objective function if it is unique.
Assuming v
(s)
k ; c
(s)
k are i.i.d., the optimality condition reduces to
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or
dE[vkjbk]
dbk
= 
dE[ckjbk]
dbk
:
Proof of Lemma 1
The probability that the bid of the next advertiser is less than x for some x < b conditional
on the bid b and the position i is equal to the probability that exactly i advertisers bid
more than b and exactly N   i advertisers bid less than x divided by the probability that
the position is i. That is,
F (b = xjb; pos = i)
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=
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Proof of Lemma 2
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=
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Proof of Proposition 2
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Proof of Equation 3.13
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Proof of Proposition 4
Let hN (b) =
R b
0 [1   F (b) + F (x)]Ndx, gN (b) = [1 + (   1)F (b)]N and 	(b) = b +
hN 1(b)=((   1)gN 1(b)). If 	(b) is monotonically increasing then there is a unique b
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Figure 11: hN (b)=gN (b) v/s b assuming the competitors bids are Weibull( = 1:59;  =
1:37;  = 1:42). The ratio hN (b)=gN (b) decreases as N increases.
that satises the optimality condition (Equation 3.14).
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:
We can show that the ratio hN (b)=gN (b) is decreasing in N implying hN 2(b)=gN 2(b) 
hN 1(b)=gN 1(b) for all N  2. This intuition is illustrated in Figure (11) for a sample
distribution. It can be seen that hN (b)=gN (b) decreases as N is increased.
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This implies that 	0(b) > 0 if (write substituting )
[1 + (   1)F (b)] > f(b)(N   1)hN 2(b)
gN 2(b)
;
or  > 1 +
1
F (b)

f(b)(N   1)hN 2(b)
gN 2(b)
  1

If the rate of decay of the ctr with respect to position () is high enough, then there exists
a unique b that satises the optimality condition. For some common distributions like the
Weibull, Gamma and Log-Normal we numerically nd that 	(b) is always increasing in b
and there exists a unique bid for every keyword k that satises the optimality condition.
This is illustrated in Figure (12) for some sample parameters.
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Figure 12: 	(b) for various distributions.
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Measuring Competitive Reaction
If there is competitive reaction then the predicted average position and CPC would be
considerably dierent from the observed position or CPC as the competitors might change
their bids as a response to the changes in bids by the advertiser. If the predicted and
observed moments of these quantities are not very dierent, it suggests that the competitive
reaction is subdued. In order to measure competitive reaction, we compute the dierence
between the predicted daily average position and cpc and the mean of these quantities. The
MAE is reported in the table below.
Table 17: MAE between the predicted and observed moments
Quantity MAE
position 0.141
cpc $0:064
Given that these observed quantities are very close to the predicted values, this provides
evidence to suggest that there is very weak competitive reaction during the experimental
phase.
Appendix A3: Estimation of DLM parameters
This appendix provides an overview of the sampling procedure used to estimate parameters
of the Dynamic Linear Model mentioned in Section 6.1. The sampling procedure mentioned
here is an application of the method proposed by West and Harrison (1997). We need to
estimate the parameters of the transition matrix (A;B;G, G;B), the eect of generic
and branded clicks (G;B), the covariance matrices (V";V) and the sequence of state
vectors T = f1; : : : ; T g. We start o with non-informative Gaussian priors for these
parameters 	 =(A;B;G, G;B,G;B). We also assume that "t and t are independent
and the priors for V" and V are assumed to be inverse Wishart. Given these assumptions,
the posteriors distributions of V" and V are inverse Wishart and the posteriors for the
parameters (A;B;G, G;B,G;B) are Gaussian.
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Let Dt = fYt;Dt 1g denote all the information available to the researcher till time t, e.g.
the clicks and impressions till time t. We use a forward-ltering and backward smoothing
algorithm (e.g. Rutz and Bucklin, 2011) to sample the state spaces, tjDt. Then we sam-
ple the parameters (A;B;G, G;B,G;B) given t and Dt. These estimation steps are
described below.
Step 1: Simulation for T
i) For t = 1; : : : ; T , compute mt and t, the mean and the variance of the state space
at time t. mt and tare derived sequentially from the priors m0 and 0 according to the
procedure outlined in West and Harrison (1997, Chapter 4).
ii) Filter-forward step: For t = T , sample p(T jDT ) from the posterior distribution
N(mT ;T ).
iii) Backward-smoothing step: For t = T; : : : ; 1, sample p(t 1jt;DT ) conditional on
the latest draw t.
Step 2: Sampling from p(	; V"; V jT ; DT )
We sample the parameters 	, V" and V sequentially. This is reasonable as the elements of
the transition matrix, drift vectors and the error terms are assumed to be independent of
each other. Based on these assumptions the Gibbs sampler can be used in a straight-forward
manner to draw samples of A; B; G, G; B, G; B, V" and V separately.
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CHAPTER 4 : The Long Road to Online Conversion: A Model of Multi-Touch
Attribution
4.1. Introduction
Online advertising has enabled advertisers to target their consumers using various channels
like Hulu, Yahoo, nytimes.com, search engines or social networks. The PEW Internet report
estimates the total online advertising expenditure to be US$ 40 billion by the year 2012.
Although the Internet surpassed print and radio as an advertising medium in 2011 and
currently accounts for 13-19% of the advertising spend, there continues to be tremendous
room for growth given the amount of time consumers spend online. Online advertising has
been embraced by a large number of advertisers as it not only allows for very granular
targeting but is also extremely quantiable, enabling advertisers to measure the impact of
their advertising dollars. Although there are various forms of digital advertising like email
marketing, social media and mobile marketing, it continues to be dominated by display
and search advertising which account for almost ¾ of this expenditure. Search advertising
comprises ads shown on search engines whereas display advertising consists of banner ads
and emerging video formats on websites like You tube and Hulu.
A typical advertiser uses dierent channels and various ad formats to convey his message
to consumers. This can include both traditional channels like television, newspapers, direct
mailing or digital channels like sponsored search, display or social ads. In this paper,
we focus primarily on the digital channels. Since the advertisers uses multiple channels
for advertising, a consumer can be exposed to several dierent ads during his browsing
sessions. These repeated interactions with an advertiser's campaign are termed \multi-
touch" in popular press (Kaushik, 2012). When the user buys a product or signs up for
a service (converts), his decision is inuenced by prior ad exposures as shown in Figure 1.
The advertiser wants to ascertain which ads across the dierent channels has an inuence
on the consumer's decision and to what extent. This problem of quantifying the inuence
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Figure 13: Multiple ad exposures across dierent online channels.
of each ad on the consumer's decision is referred to as the attribution problem. Once the
advertiser can measure the contribution of each ad, he can use this information to optimize
his ad spending.
Online channels oer a unique opportunity to address the attribution problem as advertisers
have disaggregate individual level data which was not available in the case of traditional
channels like television and newspapers. Given the lack of disaggregate data, the marketing
literature has focused primarily on the marketing mix models (Naik et al., 2005; Ansari
et al., 1995; Ramaswamy et al., 1993) which perform inter-temporal analysis of marketing
channels but fail to provide insights at an individual customer level. Online advertising
allows advertisers to not only observe the ads that a consumer was exposed to but also
when the exposure took place. This granular data can be used to build rich models of
consumer response to online ads. Unfortunately, there is very little academic research that
analyzes multi-channel advertising data or addresses the problem of attribution.
In the absence of appropriate techniques, marketers have adopted rule based techniques
like last-touch attribution (LTA), which assigns all the credit for a conversion to the click
or impression that took place right before the conversion. Although the LTA is commonly
used in the advertising industry, it completely ignores the inuence that ads before the
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last clicked (or viewed) ad had on the consumer's decision. This causes ads that appear
much earlier in the conversion funnel, e.g. display ads, to receive much less credit and ads
that occur closer to the conversion event, e.g. search ads, to receive most of the credit
for the conversion event. A consumer might have started down the path of conversion
after being inuenced by a display ad, but the LTA would suggest that the display ad
had no impact on the consumer's decision. Incorrect attribution methods might move
advertising dollars away from important channels and have a detrimental impact on the
advertiser's revenues in the long term. This is evident in the case of display ads as the lack
of appropriate attribution models have led advertisers to believe that display advertising is
not very eective, thereby hindering the growth of this format of advertising. It should be
noted that incorrect measurement also alters the publishers incentives (Jordan et al., 2011).
If an ad displayed by the publisher is undervalued, she might be incentivized to display
\seemingly" more protable ads. This not only has an adverse eect on the advertiser but
also increases the ineciency in the marketplace.
Some heuristics have been proposed to address the problems associated with LTA, e.g. rst-
touch attribution or exponentially weighted attribution, but these techniques are plagued
with similar problems and do not take a data-driven approach to address the issue of at-
tribution. In the past few years, as several online channels have gained importance, most
advertisers have come to realize the inadequacies associated with their current method-
ologies (Chandler-Pepelnjak, 2009; Kaushik, 2012). Developing an appropriate advertising
attribution model is one of the biggest challenges facing the online advertising industry
(Quinn, 2012; Khatibloo, 2010; New York Times, 2012; Szulc, 2012). In recent years, com-
panies like Microsoft, Adometry and Clear Saleing have proposed heuristics that address
this issue, but there is no clear consensus on which approach is the most appropriate.
Surprisingly, there is very little academic research on this problem given its managerial
relevance. There are some recent papers that adopt a more rigorous data-driven approach
(Shao and Li, 2011; Dalessandro et al., 2012). Shao and Li (2011) propose a simple prob-
abilistic model that solves the attribution problem using a combination of rst and second
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order conditional probabilities. Dalessandro et al. (2012) formulate multi-touch attribution
as a causal estimation problem and present a general model for multi-touch attribution.
Jordan et. al. (2012) approach this problem from a mechanism designer's perspective and
analytically devise an allocation and pricing rule for these ads.
In this paper we propose a model for online ad-attribution using a dynamic hidden Markov
model (HMM). We present a model of individual consumer behavior based on the concept of
a conversion funnel that captures a consumer's deliberation process. The conversion funnel
is a model of a consumer's search and purchase process that is commonly used by marketeers
(Kotler and Armstrong, 2011). A consumer moves in a staged manner from a dormant state
to the state of conversion and ads aect the movement through the dierent stages. This
model is estimated using a unique dataset from a car manufacturer that contains all the
online advertising data from the beginning of a campaign. We observe that dierent ad
formats, e.g. display and search ads, aect the consumers dierently and in dierent states
of their decision process. Display ads usually have an early impact on the consumer, moving
him from a state of dormancy to a state where he is aware of the product and it might enter
his consideration set. However, when the consumer actively interacts with these ads (e.g.
by clicking on them), his likelihood to convert considerably increases. Secondly, we present
an attribution scheme based on the proposed model that assigns credit to an ad based on
the incremental impact it has on the consumer's probability to convert. This method is
subsequently compared to the LTA scheme.
The paper is organized as followed. We discuss the relevant literature in Section 2 and
position our research in the existing literature. In Section 3, we describe the data that we
use in our empirical application. We present the dynamic HMM in Section 4 and discuss
the estimation technique. The empirical results are present in Section 5. In section 6, we
discuss some limitations of our model. We nally conclude in Section 7 with directions for
future research.
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4.2. Prior Literature
There has been signicant managerial interest in the attribution problem, but the academic
literature in this area has been sparse particularly due the absence of suitable multi-channel
data. Access to these data has led to recent work by Shao and Li (2011) and Dalessandro
et al. (2012) who adopt a data-driven strategy to address the problem of attribution. Shao
and Li (2011) develop a bagged logistic regression model to predict how ads from dier-
ent channels lead to a conversion. This model is further used to estimate an advertising
channel's contribution towards a conversion. They also propose another probabilistic model
based on a combination of rst and second-order conditional probabilities to directly quan-
tify the impact of an advertising channel on the conversion decision. In their models, an
ad has the same eect whether it was the rst ad that the consumer saw or the tenth ad
he saw, which is clearly not a reasonable assumption. Dalessandro et al. (2012) extend this
research by incorporating the sequence of ads that lead a consumer to his nal decision.
They use a logistic regression similar to Shao and Li (2011) to construct a mapping from
advertising exposures to conversion probability, however while performing the attribution,
they consider how an ad incrementally alters the transition probability conditional on all
the prior exposures. These papers are statistically motivated and do not incorporate a
model that underlies observed consumer behavior. As a result they might not be able to
capture the dierent stages of a consumer's deliberation process and the varied susceptibil-
ity to advertising activities in these stages. In this paper, we try to extend this literature by
incorporating well established theories from the information processing literature (Bettman
et al., 1998; Howard and Sheth, 1969; Hawkins et al., 1995). This literature suggests that
consumer decision making involve a multi-stage process of { (i) awareness, (ii) information
search, (iii) evaluation, (iv) purchase and nally (v) post-purchase activity (Jansen and
Schuster, 2011). More specically, we base our model of consumer behavior on the conver-
sion funnel which is commonly used in practice (Mulpuru, 2011; Court et al., 2009) and
analyzed in the marketing literature (Strong, 1925; Howard and Sheth, 1969; Barry, 1987).
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Our research is closely related to the literature on online advertising (Tucker, 2012; Goldfarb
and Tucker, 2011; Ghose and Yang, 2009; Agarwal et al., 2011). Most of the work in this area
has focused on sponsored search where researchers have tried to analyze what factors aect
consumer behavior (Rutz et al., 2012; Ghose and Yang, 2009) and rm protability (Agarwal
et al., 2011; Ghose and Yang, 2009). More recently, researchers have turned to other forms
of advertising like display (Goldfarb and Tucker, 2011) and facebook ads (Tucker, 2012).
Goldfarb and Tucker (2011) show that matching an ad to the website content and increasing
an ad's obtrusiveness independently increase purchase intent. However, in combination,
these two strategies negate each other due to privacy concerns. Tucker (2012) investigates
how users' perception of control over their personal information aects their likelihood to
click ads on Facebook. She shows that with an increase in privacy controls, users are twice
as likely to click on these ads. Although there is a lot of research on dierent formats of
online advertising, researchers haven't looked at how these ads interacts in a multi-channel
context. This paper tries to address this gap in the extant literature and proposes a model
to a gain a better understanding of consumer response to dierent types of online ads.
From a methodological viewpoint, our research belongs to the extensive literature on HMMs
in computer science (Rabiner, 1989) and more recently in marketing (Netzer et al., 2008;
Montoya et al., 2010; Schwartz et al., 2011). HMM is a workhorse technique in computer
science that has been applied to various application like speech recognition (Rabiner, 1989),
message parsing (Molina and Pla, 2002) and facial recognition (Nean et al., 1998) among
other things. In the marketing literature, HMMs are used to capture dynamic consumer
behavior when the consumer's state is unobservable (Netzer et al., 2008; Schweidel et al.,
2011). HMM have been used to study physicians' prescription behavior (Montoya et al.,
2010), customer relationships (Netzer et al., 2008) and online viewing behavior (Schwartz
et al., 2011). Most of the papers in the literature incorporate time varying covariates
to account for marketing actions, e.g. Montoya et al. (2010) analyze how detailing and
sampling activities can move physicians from one state to another and alter their propensity
to prescribe a newly introduced medicine. We adopt a similar approach in our paper to
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model the dynamics of the HMM.
4.3. Data Description
Our data is provided by a large digital advertising agency that managed the entire online
campaign for a car manufacturer. This data spans a period of around 11 weeks from
June 8, 2009 to August 23, 2009. The ad agency promoted display ads on several generic
websites like Yahoo, MSN and Facebook and auto-specic websites like KBB and Edmunds.
In addition, it also advertised on search engines like Google and Yahoo. Users are tracked
across the dierent advertising channels and on the car manufacturer's website using cookies.
The context of car sales is very relevant to the attribution problem as consumers spend a lot
of time researching cars online, sometimes several weeks and as a consequence are exposed
to ads in various format, across dierent online channels.
This dataset is unique as it contains all the display and search advertising data at an
individual level since the start of the campaign. Our sample comprises a panel of 6432
randomly chosen users with a total of 146,165 observations. An observation in our dataset
comprises a display ad impression or click (generic/specic), a search click or activity (page
view/conversion) on the advertiser's website. We do not observe the search ads that were
shown to consumers (as this data is not reported by the search engine), however when a
consumer clicks on one of these ads and arrives at the advertiser's website, this click is
recorded in our data and referred to as a search click. A conversion in this data is said
to occur when the user performs one of the following activities on the advertiser's website
- search inventory, nd a dealer, build & price and get a quote. We do not focus on the
dierent conversion activities and treat them similarly. Furthermore, as we are interested
in how the ads drive the rst conversion, we discard all the observations for a particular
consumer after the rst conversion. Since we are interested in the eect of advertising on the
conversion process, we also eliminate users in our data that do not have any ad exposures.
This results in a panel size of 5121 users with 112,619 observations. Summary statistics of
this data at an individual level is presented in Table 18 below.
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Mean S.D.
Generic display impressions 13.756 34.725
Generic display clicks 0.072 0.180
Generic click-through rate 0.007 0.054
Specic display impressions 4.211 10.06
Specic display clicks 0.143 0.32
Specic click-through rate 0.020 0.062
Search clicks 0.246 0.719
Web pages viewed 3.471 8.187
Conversions 0.152 0.359
Table 18: Summary Statistics
On an average there are 13.756 display impressions per customer on generic websites and
4.211 impressions on auto-specic websites. Consumers click 0.007 of these display ads on
generic websites and 0.143 on auto-specic websites. We see that the click-through rate
for display ads on auto-specic websites is much higher than on generic websites which
indicates that context plays an important role in the consumer's click-through and decision
making process. Consumers browse 3.471 pages on the car manufacturer's website in this
dataset. Most of ads in this campaign are \call to action" ads, which explains the high
conversion rate { 15.2% of all the consumers in this dataset end up engaging in one of the
four conversion activities mentioned earlier.
4.4. Model of Multi-Touch Attribution
In this section we rst present a HMM of consumer behavior and then show how this model
can be used to solve the attribution problem
4.4.1. The Conversion Funnel
Our model is inspired by the idea of a conversion funnel that has been at the center of
the marketing literature for several decades (Strong, 1925; Howard and Sheth, 1969; Barry,
1987). The conversion funnel is also widely adopted by practitioners and managers who
frequently base their marketing decision on the conversion funnel (Mulpuru, 2011; Court
et al., 2009). The conversion funnel is grounded in the information processing theory which
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postulates how consumers behave while taking a decision (Bettman et al., 1998). This
literature suggests that consumers move through dierent stages of deliberation during
their purchase decision process. Several marketing actions, e.g. advertising, help the user
in moving closer to the end goal, i.e. an eventual purchase. This framework is also similar to
the AIDA (attention, interest, desire and action) model (Kotler and Armstrong, 2011) and
hierarchy of eects model (Bruner and Kumar, 2000) that are commonly used in marketing.
Several variants of the conversion funnel have been proposed, but the most commonly used
funnel has following stages - awareness, consideration and purchase (Jansen and Schuster,
2011; Mulpuru, 2011; Court et al., 2009). A consumer is initially in a dormant state when
he is unaware of the product or is not deliberating a purchase. When he is exposed to an
ad, he might move into a state of awareness. Subsequently, if he is interested in the product,
he transitions to a consideration stage where he engages in information seeking activities
like visiting the website of the advertiser and reading product reviews (this is sometimes
referred to as the research stage in the purchase funnel). Finally, based on his consideration,
the consumer decides to engage in the conversion event or not. In the following discussion,
we introduce a parsimonious model that captures the dynamics of the conversion funnel.
Although the conversion funnel is widely accepted and used, it has been dicult to analyze
the movement of a consumer down the funnel in the context of traditional advertising.
Most of the data in traditional advertising is available at an aggregate level which makes
it dicult to tease apart the dierent stages of the consumer deliberation process outlined
earlier. The individual level data presented in Section 3 oers a unique opportunity to
analyze the consumer behavior at a much granular level and examine the conversion funnel
using observational data.
4.4.2. Hidden Markov Model
In our data, we do not observe a consumer's underlying state and it can be inferred only
through the consumer's observable actions, i.e. website visits and conversion. In this sense
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the consumer's state is latent and his progression through the conversion funnel is hidden.
In this paper, we use a HMM to capture the user's deliberation process and his movement
down the conversion funnel as a result of the dierent ad exposures he experiences. Several
researchers have uses HMMs to model latent consumer states (Montoya et al., 2010; Netzer
et al., 2008; Schwartz et al., 2011; Schweidel et al., 2011) and they are particularly suited
for the problem of attribution as we explain in the next section.
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Figure 14: Diagram representing the latent states and the outcomes of the HMM. qss0 denote
the transition probabilities from state s to state s0 and Ys is the binary random variable
that captures conversion in state s.
In accordance with the conversion funnel, we construct an HMM with four states (S), where
the four states are \dormant", \awareness", \consideration" and \conversion" (Figure 14).
At any time t, consumer i can be in one of the four states, Sit 2 S.1 As mentioned earlier,
we do not observe sit, but we observe the bivariate outcome variable Yit = (Nit; Cit) which
arises from a stochastic process conditional on the state Sit. Nit is a Poisson random variable
that denotes the number of pages viewed by the consumer between time t and t + 1 and
Cit is a binary random variable which captures whether there was a conversion between
time t and t + 1. When the user is in a dormant state, he is unaware of the product or
1Variables in uppercase denote random variables and variable in lowercase denote their realizations. In
addition, set notation supersedes notation for random variables unless otherwise noted.
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is not deliberating a purchase. In this state, there is no activity from the consumers and
the outcomes variables, page views and conversion, are set to zero. As the consumer is
exposed to dierent ads, he might move into a state of awareness where he knows about
the product and might be willing to purchase it. On further deliberation, he moves into a
consideration state, where he can actively look for product related information and engage
with the rm's website. Consumers can also go directly from the dormant state to the state
of consideration. In this model, the research stage is implicitly captured by the consumer's
interaction with the advertiser's website (measured through page views). As we model only
the first conversion behavior of the consumer, the consumer moves into the \conversion"
state as soon as a conversion occurs. \Conversion" is a dummy absorbing state which
captures the fact that once a consumer has engaged in a conversion activity, he ceases to
exist in our data.
We assume that a consumer's propensity to purchase (or convert) is zero in the dormant
state and it steadily increases as he moves down the dierent states. We also assume that the
consumer's research behavior becomes more intense as he moves down the funnel, e.g.. he
is likely to visit the advertiser's website more often when he is in the consideration state as
opposed to the awareness state. The transition between the states take place in a stochastic
manner when an ad event ait occurs and is inuenced by the rm's advertising activities
so far. Ads from dierent channels can have dierent eects on these transitions and these
eects can be state specic. The transitions between the dierent states also follow a Markov
process, i.e. the transitions out of a particular state depend only on the current state and
not on the path that the user took to get to the state. Let Ai = fai1; ai2; : : : ; aiT g denote
a sequence of T ad events that consumer i is exposed to, due to which the consumer ends
up in states Si = fSi1; Si2; : : : ; SiT g. x0it captures the running sum of the dierent kinds of
advertising activities till time t and contains covariates like number of display impressions
at a generic website, number of display impressions at an auto-specic website and search
clicks. We do not observe Si but observe the observation vector Yi = fYi1; Yi2; : : : ; YiT g.
The joint probability of observing the sequence of observations fYi1 = yi1; : : : ; YiT = yiT g
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is a function of three main components: (i) the transition probabilities between the dierent
states { Qit, (ii) the distribution of the observational variables conditional on the state {
Mit denotes the probability of conversion and Nit  Poisson(its) , and (3) the initial state
distribution { . We describe each of these components in detail below.
Markov Chain Transition Matrix
In our model, there might be a transition from the current state sit only under two conditions
- (i) when a consumer is exposed to an ad event ait, or (ii) when a conversion takes place
and the consumer moves to the \conversion" state with certainty. If the transition occurs
due to an ad event, consumer i's transition from one latent state to another is stochastically
based on the transition matrix Qit which is a function of the advertising activities, x
0
it at
time t. The probability that a consumer transitions to state s0 at time t+ 1 conditional on
him being in state s at time t is given by P (Sit = s
0jSit 1 = s) = qitss0 . Let Ts be the set of
states (s0) that can be reached from state s. The elements of the transitions matrix specic
to state s are given by
qitss0 =
expfx0itss0g
1 +
P
s02Ts expfx0itss0g
8 s0 6= s; (4.1)
qitss =
1
1 +
P
s02Ts expfx0itss0g
; (4.2)
where ss0 is the response parameter that captures how the advertising related activities
aect the consumer's propensity to transition from state s to s0. ss0 is dierent across
states as the advertising activities x0it might have dierent eects on the transition based
on the receiving state. For e.g. display clicks might aect the transition to the \dormant"
state dierently than the transition to the \consideration" state.
Consumer Research and Conversion Behavior
For every consumer, the bivariate outcome variable Yit = (Nit; Cit) is modeled in the
following manner.
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Modeling page views: Nit is drawn from a Poisson distribution with a rate parameter its
which is a function of the current state s and advertising activity, xit. The probability of
observing nit page views is given by
P (Nit = nitjSit = s) = 
nit
its e
 its
nist!
;
where its = es + x0its, i.e. the rate parameter is the a function of the intrinsic research
activity in state s and the time varying covariates xits. Note that there is no research
activity in the dormant state, therefore it1  0. We also assume that the research intensity
increases as the consumer moves down the conversion funnel. This constraint is enforced
by setting
e2 = 2;
e3 = e2 + expf3g;
where 2 and 3 are parameters to be estimated from the data.
Modeling conversions: The consumer's probability to convert depends on the state in which
he is present. We follow Montoya et al. (2010) in modeling the conversion Cit which is binary
random variable. The conditional probability P (Cit = 1jSit = s) = mits is given by
mits =
expf~s + z0itsg
1 + expf~s + z0itsg
:
z0it a vector of time varying covariates which contains the advertising related activities in
addition to the number of web pages the consumer has viewed on the advertiser's website.
The number of page views are included in addition to the marketing activities because a
consumer might be more likely to convert if he has viewed more web pages and has gathered
more information about the product. s captures how these covariates aect the conversion
probability. We assume that there are no conversions in the dormant state (mit1 = 0) and
the probability to convert, on average, increases as we move down the conversion funnel.
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This assumption is operationalized in the following manner,
~2 = 2;
~3 = ~2 + expf3g;
where 2 and 3 are the parameters to be estimated from the data. This structure enforces
that mit3  mit2, ceteris paribus. This assumption ensures the identication of the dierent
states and is consistent with the approach adopted by Netzer et al. (2008) and Montoya
et al. (2010).
Joint density : In our model we also assume that Nit and Cit are independent once the eect
of Nit on zit has been accounted for. Hence, the conditional probability of observing yit is
given by
P (Yit = yitjSit = s) = mcitits(1 mits)(1 cit)P (Nits = nitjSit = s) (4.3)
where yit = (nit; cit)
0 is the realized outcome variable.
Initial State Membership
Let s denote the probability that consumers are in initially in state s, where
P
s2S s = 1.
2
Consumers can start out in dierent states because of their exposure to ads on other media
like television or print which can aect the initial membership probability. However, we do
not have data about other forms of advertising and hence we assume that all consumers
start out in the dormant state and move down the conversion funnel, i.e. initial membership
probability is given by  = f1; 0; 0; 0g which is an assumption we make for the identication
of the model as explained in the Appendix. We think this is a reasonable assumption
because the advertising campaign pertains to a new brand of cars and consumers might
have been completely unaware of the product before the launch of the online campaign.
In summary, the dynamic HMM captures the consumers' behavior as they transition across
2Note that the subscript for the consumer is dropped because all consumers are considered homogeneous
ex-ante.
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the dierent states of the funnel and eventually convert. This model allows the ads to have
an eect on consumers behavior { they aect the transition probabilities as well as the
product research and conversion activities. Thus, these ads not only have an immediate
impact on the consumers by changing their conversion probabilities, but they can also move
consumers to dierent stages in the conversion funnel which can have an impact on their
future conversion behavior. It should be noted that we do not incorporate consumer het-
erogeneity in our model for simplicity. However, there might be dierences in consumers'
behavior due to their prior relationship with the brand, oine advertising activity or un-
derlying demographic variables. We extend the current model to account for observed and
unobserved consumer heterogeneity in Section 6. Thus, the model allows us to attribute
suitable credit to an ad even if it does not contribute to a conversion right away but helps in
moving the consumer to a state with higher conversion probability. In this sense, our model
diers considerably from the approach adopted by Shao and Li (2011) and Dalessandro
et al. (2012) which attribute credit to an ad only when it directly leads to conversion. In
the following discussion, we explain how the ad events aect these transitions and how the
aforementioned model can be used to solve the attribution problem.
4.4.3. Ad Attribution
When consumer i is exposed to an ordered set of ad related activities Ai = fai1; ai2; : : : aiT g,
he moves through the dierent states of the HMM in the manner described above. ait is
a categorical variable that captures the ad related activity the consumer is exposed to,
i.e. ait 2 f\display impression on generic website", \display impression on auto-specic
website", \click on generic website", \click on auto-specic website", \search click"g. The
total number of ad related events experienced by a consumer, T , can vary across customers.
In our model, the ad related event ait aects the customer i's underlying time varying
parameters x0it and z
0
it as shown below,
xit 1
ait ! xit;
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zit 1
ait ! zit:
Hence, ait has a two fold eect on the consumer's probability to convert which is shown
below { (i) it alters the conditional conversion probability, through changes in z0it and (ii)
it can lead to a transition of the consumer from one state to another by aecting x0it.
Attribution in the context of online advertising involves measuring the incremental change
ait provides in the conversion propensity. Keeping these factors in mind, we provide two
approaches to measure the value of an ad related event. For simplicity we assume that the
advertiser earns $1 whenever a conversion occurs.
Forward-Looking Attribution
Let Ait be a subset of Ai which contains the ad events until time t  T . In the forward-
looking approach, Vit, the value of an ad event ait, is measured by the eect it has in
expectation on the consumer i's conversion decision.
Vit = E[CijAit = fai1; ai2; : : : ; aitg]  E[CijAit 1 = fai1; ai2; : : : ; ait 1g]; (4.4)
= P (Cit = 1jAit)  P (Cit 1 = 1jAit 1):
The eect of an ad depends on the consumer's underlying state which in turn is aected
by the ads that preceded ait. The value of an ad is not only a function of the impact of
the ad going forward, but also depends on the other ad exposures that took place before
time t, and the attribution method presented in Equation (4.4) explicitly accounts for the
eect of preceding ads. This approach is similar to Shao and Li (2011) and Dalessandro
et al. (2012), but P (Cit = 1jAit) is estimated using a dynamic HMM in our case whereas
they use simplistic approaches like a logistic regression and sample means to compute these
probabilities. It should be noted that this method diers vastly from LTA which attributes
100% of the conversion to the last ad event and completely disregards the eects of ads that
came earlier. The value ascribed to a specic type of ad event, k 2 f\display impression on
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generic website", : : :, \search click"g, can be computed by summing across all ad activities
of that type,
k =
X
i
TX
t=1
1fait=kgVit; (4.5)
where 1fait=kg is an indicator function that equals one if ad event ait is of type k.
Backward-Looking Attribution
The prior approach addresses the problem of attribution based on the marginal eect an
ad has on the conversion probability. In this formulation, we measure the eect of an ad
conditional on a conversion event. An ad ait's value in this case is computed by
eVit = P (Cit = 1jAit)  P (Cit 1 = 1jAit 1)
P (Ci = 1jAi) :
This method attributes all the proceeds from a conversion to ads that occurred before the
conversion took place, although their relative contribution is weighted by eV it. The value
assigned to a specic type of an ad event can be computed by
ek =X
i
Ci
TX
t=1
1fait=kg eVit; (4.6)
where Ci denotes whether we observe a conversion for customer i in the data.
In order to solve the attribution problem, we need to estimate the parameters of the HMM
which is presented in the subsequent section.
4.5. Empirical Analysis
In this section, we illustrate how the HMM model can be estimated and interpreted. A
richer model of consumer behavior which incorporates consumer heterogeneity is presented
in Section 5. The dynamic HMM is estimated on the car campaign data presented in Section
3. We rst outline the estimation procedure, briey discuss the model validity and continue
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to present the estimated parameters. A sample of 4121 users is used for estimating the
model and the remaining 1000 users are used for validation.
4.5.1. Estimation Procedure
Here, we outline the procedure of estimating the HMM on the data shown in Section 3. Our
model diers from standard HMMs as the transition probabilities depend on the covariates
that vary over time. Several techniques have been proposed to incorporate the time varying
covariates in the HMM which are collectively referred to as the latent transition models.
Three of the most common techniques used to estimate these models are maximum like-
lihood estimation (ML), expectation maximization (EM) and Markov chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) methods. In one step maximum likelihood approaches like Newton Raphson, the
entire joint likelihood of observing the data is maximized to arrive at the parameter esti-
mates (Satten and Longini, 1996; Cooper and Lipsitch, 2004). The EM techniques involves
two steps - in the rst step, the likelihood of observing the data is derived conditional on
the parameters (expectation step), and subsequently the parameters are updated to t the
data better (maximization step) (Baum et al., 1970; Bureau et al., 2003). A third step
is incorporated to estimate the eect of the time varying covariates on the transitions be-
tween the states and the observations associated with these states (Visser et al., 2009).
More recently, some researchers have adopted a Bayesian approach, where the parameters
are drawn from a posterior distribution using MCMC simulations. The Bayesian approach
allows for easy model diagnostics using the posterior predictive checks (Berkhof et al., 2000;
Schwartz et al., 2011) and also provides an easy way to compute standard errors for the
parameters which might be dicult in the ML and EM techniques under certain conditions
(Chung et al., 2007). MCMC techniques have also been employed extensively in the latent
state literature in marketing (Montoya et al., 2010; Netzer et al., 2008). EM and MCMC
techniques are generally used for their computational speed and eciency. Computing the
joint probability of the observed data can be computationally intensive for large values of
T . However, maximum likelihood approaches like Newton Raphson have better convergence
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properties as compared to the EM and MCMC techniques which tend to converge to local
minimas. As T is relatively small in our data (T = 18:3) and computational complexity is
not a big concern, we adopt the maximum likelihood approach to estimate our parameters.
We begin by deriving the likelihood of observing the data. Given a sequence of ad events
Ai, the consumer can take several dierent paths s0 ! s1 ! : : : ! sT . The sequence
of the states during this transition determines the probability of the observations yi =
fyi1;yi2; : : :yiT g. The likelihood of a matrix (2  T ) of outcome variables yi after being
exposed to these actions Ai can be computed by evaluating the probabilities of each of these
path s0 ! : : : ! sT and the conditional probability of P (Yi1 = yi1; : : : ; YiT = yiT ; jS0 =
s0; : : : ; ST = sT ) which is given by
Li =
jSjX
s1=1
jSjX
s2=1
: : :
jSjX
sT=1
"
TY
t=1
P (Sit = stjSit 1 = st 1)
TY
t=1
P (Yit = yitjSit = st)
#
; (4.7)
where P (Yit = yitjSit = st) can be computed as shown in Equation (4.3). This approach of
summing over all possible paths has a complexity O(jSjT ) and might be computationally
infeasible even for moderately small values of jSj and T (Cooper and Lipsitch, 2004). In
order to overcome this computational complexity, McDonald and Zucchini (1997) propose
an approach that signicantly reduced the amount of computation required. Let
it(yit) = Diag(P (Yit = ytjSit = 1); : : : ; P (Yit = ytjSit = jSj));
where P (Yit = ytjSit = s) is as mentioned in Equation (4.3). The likelihood of the observed
data (Equation (4.7)) can be simplied to
Li = 
0i0(yi0)Qi1i1(yi2)Qi2 : : : QiTiT (yiT ):1; (4.8)
where 1 is a 1  jSj vector of ones. This computation is signicantly much faster and can
be evaluated in O(T jSj2) time. The log-likelihood of observing the entire data is given by
the sum of the log-likelihood across all consumers in the data,
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LL =
X
i
log

0i0(yi0)Qi1i1(yi2)Qi2 : : : QiTiT (yiT ):1

: (4.9)
The parameters of the model can be estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood function
shown in Equation (4.9) using any non-linear optimization technique. We use the ClsSolve
routine from TOMLAB to perform the unconstrained numerical optimization.
4.5.2. Model Validity
To test the validity of our model, we compare the predictive ability of the model with the
commonly used logit model (Dalessandro et al., 2012; Ghose and Yang, 2009; Agarwal et al.,
2011). The comparison is performed using two dierent approaches. First, we compare
the log-likelihood of observing the outcome (conversion/no conversion) in the validation
dataset. Secondly, we compute the root mean-squared error (RMSE) by calculating the
dierence between the observed outcome and the predicted outcome from the two models.
These results are presented in Table 19 below. We observe that the HMM considerably
outperforms the logit model on both these measures.
Table 19: Predictive validity
Validation RMSE
log-likelihood
HMM -1692.7 0.097
Logit -2039.5 0.182
4.5.3. Parameter Estimates
Estimates of the Transition Parameters
Estimates of the transition parameters are reported in Table 20. The intercept terms are
signicantly negative which indicates that these states are relatively sticky and consumers
do not easily transition between them. We also observe that ad related activities have a
signicant impact on the transition from the dormant state to the awareness state. Contrary
to popular belief that display ads are ineective (de Vries, 2012; Claburn, 2012), we see that
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display ads have an important eect of moving consumers from a dormant state to a state of
awareness. They might not have a high conversion rate, but our model predicts that these
ads signicantly impact the consumer's deliberation process. This nding has signicant
implications for marketeers as they need to understand that display advertising has an
indirect eect on conversions and they should account for this dierence (as compared to
search ads) in their attribution approach. In addition, display ads on auto-specic websites
have a larger impact on the transition from the dormant state to the awareness state.
Consumers might be more likely to notice these car related ads when they are visiting auto-
specic website. Yi (1990) shows that consumers' response to ads can change signicantly
when they are primed by relevant context.
Table 20: Estimates of the transition parameters ()
12 13 21 23 31 32
(intercept) -2.864*** -5.632*** -3.713*** -2.206*** -3.405*** -4.327***
(0.033) (1.073) (0.078) (0.384) (0.471) (0.732)
generic imp 0.009*** 0.003 0.102*** 0.002 0.009 0.003
(0.029) (0.003) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
specic imp 0.014*** 0.002 0.008 0.003 -0.001 0.003
(0.009) (0.005) (0.010) (0.032) (0.001) (0.007)
generic clk 0.126*** 0.020 -0.098 0.383*** -0.001 -0.079
(0.048) (0.063) (0.150) (0.049) (0.038) (0.312)
specic clk 0.189*** 0.003 0.077 0.501*** 0.021* 0.000
(0.003) (0.048) (0.083) (0.077) (0.017) (0.000)
search clk 0.550*** 0.031* -0.029* 0.413*** 0.048 -0.002**
(0.135) (0.025) (0.023) (0.138) (0.057) (0.001)
***, **, * denotes coecients that are signicant at a 99%, 95%, 90% level, respectively
Although display ads have an impact on moving consumers from a dormant state to a state
of awareness, they do not have a signicant impact on moving consumers further down the
conversion funnel, i.e. from a state of awareness to a state of consideration (23). In fact,
we observe that too many display ads on generic websites can have a detrimental eect
on the consumer's movement towards the conversion state. As the coecient of generic
impression is positive and signicant (0.102), it suggests that if consumers are shown too
many display ads on generic websites, their probability to transition back to the dormant
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state increases considerably. We also observe that impressions do no have an impact later
on in the conversion funnel. Thus, current attribution techniques which focus mostly at the
end of the funnel, give negligible credit to these ads.
Not surprisingly, we observe that clicks have a signicant impact on the consumer's move-
ment from the awareness to the consideration state with search clicks having the largest
eect. Once the consumer moves to the consideration state, there is a very low probability
of him transitioning out of that state. This probability is further reduced when the con-
sumer performs more searches and clicks on search ads. When a consumer actively starts
to gather information about a product (by searching for the product at a search engine),
he is likely to be at the very end of the funnel, contemplating his decision just prior to the
eventual conversion.
Now we analyze the eect of dierent ad events on the HMM transition matrix. Qi0 denotes
the transition matrix when consumer i is not exposed to any ads. Let Qis, Qic and Qid
represent the transition matrices when we observe exactly one search click, one display click
and 10 display impression for the consumer, respectively. These matrices are presented
below,
Qi0 =
0BBBB@
0:95 0:05 0:00
0:02 0:88 0:10
0:03 0:01 0:96
1CCCCA ; Qis =
0BBBB@
0:91 0:09 0:00
0:02 0:84 0:14
0:03 0:01 0:96
1CCCCA ;
Qic =
0BBBB@
0:94 0:06 0:00
0:02 0:84 0:14
0:03 0:01 0:96
1CCCCA ; Qid =
0BBBB@
0:87 0:12 0:00
0:06 0:85 0:09
0:03 0:01 0:96
1CCCCA :
In the absence of any ad related activity, the states are extremely sticky and it is unlikely
that consumer transitions between the dierent states of the HMM. When the consumer
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clicks on a search ad, the probability (Qis) that he moves down the search funnel increases
considerably (qi12 : 0:05 ! 0:09 and qi23 : 0:10 ! 0:14). The eect of a display click
is similar but not as pronounced (Qic). We look at the eect of 10 impressions as one
impression has a very small impact on the transition probabilities. Interestingly, we observe
that when the consumer is exposed to too many generic display impressions his likelihood
to move to the dormant state (in the opposite direction of the funnel) increases (qi21 :
0:02! 0:06). One possible explanation for this behavior is advertising avoidance which has
been documented by Goldfarb and Tucker (2011) and Johnson (2011) in the literature. A
consumer might completely abandon his search if he considers these ads to be too intrusive
(Goldfarb and Tucker, 2011). These transition matrices also demonstrate that consumers
move down the conversion funnel in a sequential manner, e.g. from one state to another
and we do not observe abrupt jumps from a dormant state to a state of consideration.
Estimates of the Response Parameters
Now we discuss the underlying parameters that aect the observations of the HMM. We
rst discuss the factors that aect the number of pages viewed by a customer which are
presented in Table 21. We can see that consumers in the awareness and consideration
states dier considerably when it comes to their browsing behavior. Consumers in the
consideration state view three times as many pages on the car manufacturer's website as
the consumers in the awareness state. Since the consumers in these two states behave so
dierently, we are certain that the model is both empirically and behaviorally identied.
Advertising activities tend to increase the consumers' propensity to view more web pages
but the increase is more pronounced when the consumers actively interact with the ads
(e.g. by clicking on them) than when they passively enter the consumers' perception (e.g.
through display impressions).
Next we consider factors that inuence the consumers' conversion probability. The esti-
mated coecients of these factors are presented in Table 22. We notice that the probability
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Table 21: Estimate of factors aecting the page views ()
2 3
 0.781*** 0.534***
(0.037) (0.003)e 0.781 2.487
generic imp 0.004** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.000)
specic imp 0.004*** 0.005
(0.001) (0.009)
generic clk 0.089*** 0.123***
(0.008) (0.007)
specic clk 0.132** 0.207***
(0.060) (0.008)
search clk 0.169*** 0.288***
(0.004) (0.004)
to convert is higher in the consideration state than it is in the awareness state, ceteris
paribus. Apart from impressions on generic websites, all advertising activities lead to an
increase in the conversion probability in the state of awareness. However, conditional on
being in the consideration state, impressions of any kind do not have an incremental impact
on the likelihood to convert. Interestingly, the eect of a specic click in the awareness
state is more prominent than the eect of a generic or a search click. We also observe that
an increase in the visits to the car manufacturer's website tends to increase the conversion
rate in both states. Surprisingly, this eect is stronger in the state of awareness than in
the consideration state. This decrease might be attributed to the diminishing returns from
further interactions with the consumer. Once the consumer is suciently primed to convert,
increased interactions only have a small marginal eect on him.
In Table 23, we present how dierent activities aect the conversion probability in the
awareness and the consideration states. As the consumers interact more with the advertiser
(through clicks and page views), there is a substantial increase in the conversion probability.
It should be kept in mind that the conversion probabilities shown here are atypical of online
campaigns which usually have very few conversions following a click.
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Table 22: Estimates of conversion parameters
2 3
 -4.155*** -3.087**
(0.433) (1.050)e -4.155 -3.072
generic imp 0.015 0.008
(0.010) (0.019)
specic imp 0.017** 0.020
(0.009) (0.019)
generic clk 0.289*** 0.318***
(0.084) (0.095)
specic clk 0.607*** 0.303***
(0.090) (0.083)
search clk 0.146*** 0.588***
(0.027) (0.100)
nw activity 0.091*** 0.067***
0.005 0.007
4.5.4. Ad Attribution
In this section we compare our proposed attribution scheme with the LTA and the logit
attribution method proposed by Dalessandro et al. (2012). We use the entire (training
+ validation) data and apply the attribution methodologies { LTA, logistic multi-touch
attribution (Logit-MTA) and HMM multi-touch attribution (HMM-MTA) to compute the
contribution of each ad towards the nal conversions. This result is presented in Table 24.
The last column labeled \% " shows the % dierence between the attribution computed
by the HMM-MTA and the LTA.
We observe from Table 24 that all three methods attribute a signicant portion of the
conversions to display and search clicks, which is in agreement with the coecients presented
in Table 22. Surprisingly, we see that the HMM-MTA attributes less credit to display
impressions on generic websites. In this data, generic impression occur very frequently and
as a consequence they have a high chance of being the last ad activity that took place before
a conversion event. Since they are likely to appear last, the LTA gives them undue credits
for the conversions even through they might not have had an impact on the consumer's
123
Table 23: Conversion probability as a result of various factors.
awareness consideration
No Activity 0.016 0.046
Generic Imp 0.016 0.046
Specic Imp 0.016 0.046
Generic Click 0.021 0.064
Specic Click 0.024 0.063
Search Click 0.018 0.083
Network Activity 0.017 0.050
Generic + Specic Clicks 0.032 0.086
Generic + Search Clicks 0.024 0.115
Specic + Search Clicks 0.028 0.113
Generic + Specic + Search Clicks 0.037 0.155
Generic + Specic + Search Clicks + Network Activity 0.040 0.166
Table 24: A comparison of attribution methodologies
Ad activity #Ads LTA Logit-MTA HMM-MTA %
Generic Impression 70,444 171 152.2 124.9 -27.5
Specic Impression 21,564 78 96.5 116.2 48.7
Generic Click 369 54 84.6 75.1 37.7
Specic Click 732 150 140.7 167.6 11.3
Search Click 1,260 328 310.9 294.3 -10.3
conversion probability. These ads that get credit just due to their sheer volume have been
referred to as \carpet bombers" by Dalessandro et al. (2012). We also see that the HMM-
MTA increases the number of conversions attributed to display impressions on specic
websites which illustrates that our attribution method rewards events that inuenced the
consumer's deliberation process early on in the conversion funnel. There is a marginal
increase in the conversions attributed to display clicks. The HMM-MTA assigns some the
conversions from the generic impression to these activities that had a positive inuence on
the conversions. Even though there is a slight decrease in the conversions attributed to
search clicks, it continues to remain as the most important factor under all the attribution
methodologies. This nding is consistent with the results reported by Dalessandro et al.
(2012) who show that the Logit-MTA does not lead to signicant change in the conversion
attributed to search ads. In order to compute the overall contribution of a specic channel,
e.g. generic display ads we need to account for the conversions attributed to generic display
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impressions and generic display clicks. In the present context, generic display ads are
responsible for 200 conversions and specic display ads are responsible for 283.8 conversions.
4.6. Discussion
In this section we present a few limitations of our current model and discuss how these
limitations might aect our ndings. We also provide a few directions for addressing the
limitations of our model.
4.6.1. Interactions with Other Advertising Media
In our model, we ignore the eect that other factors like traditional advertising might have
on the consumer's behavior and eventual conversion. Here, we try to explore how ignoring
these factors might bias our estimates. Let's rst consider the transition probabilities. The
transition probabilities arise from an underlying utility model that has the following form
Uitss0 = x
0
itss0 + xaitass0 + itss0 8 s0 2 S; s0 6= s
where xait captures the oine advertising activity at time t and itss0 is an extreme value
distributed error term. If the advertising activity xait is ignored, the estimates of ss0 will
be biased. The exact nature of the bias depends on the relationship between xait and x
0
it
and the sign of ass0 (Lee, 1982). If xait and x
0
it are independent, the estimates of ss0
will be biased upwards if ass0  0 and biased downward otherwise. On the other hand, if
xait = x
0
it + ", then the estimates of ss0 will be further biased by ass0.
Hence, if the oine advertising activity is independent of the online advertising activity,
the eect of this omission on the estimation procedure depends on how consumers react
to oine ads. If oine ads have a positive (negative) impact on transition from state s
to s0, then ss0 will be overestimated (underestimated). In addition, if there is a relation
between oine and online advertising activities which is likely as an advertiser's activities
across various channels are coordinated, the bias depends on the exact relationship between
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these channels. As these activities are usually positively correlated, this would lead to an
overestimation of the transition parameters. The parameters of the conversion probabilities
are aected in a similar manner.
4.6.2. Incorporating Consumer Heterogeneity
The model proposed in Section 4 does not incorporate heterogenity in consumer behavior.
Consumers might be aected dierently due to the advertising activities. This could occur
for several brand specic reasons such as prior knowledge or interaction with the brand,
exposure to ads from dierent media or due to inherent dierences in underlying consumer
behavior. In order to incorporate consumer heterogeneity in our model, we modify the
dierent components of the HMM in the following manner:
Transition Probabilities
The transition probabilities between the states in presence of consumer heterogeneity can
be written as
qitss0 =
expfis + x0itiss0g
1 +
P
s02Ts expfx0itiss0g
8 s0 6= s;
qitss =
1
1 +
P
s02Ts expfis0 + x0itiss0g
;
where unlike Equation 4.1, the coecient iss0 is specic to a consumer. This indicates
that consumers can respond dierently to the time-varying covariates in our model. x0it, in
addition to the ad related activities mentioned earlier, can contain observed demographic
variables and exposure to other media that vary across consumers. The parameter is cap-
tures the time-invariant unobserved consumer heterogeneity in our model. We assume that
the coecients (is iss0)
0 are drawn from a multivariate normal distribution N( s;s).
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Conversion Probability
In this extension, we assume that consumers can have dierent propensities to convert,
ceteris paribus. Some consumer might be automobile acionados who are not only more
likely to convert, but are also dierently aected by the dierent advertising activities.
In order to incorporate this heterogeneity between consumers, we model the conversion
probability in the following manner,
mits =
expf~s + is + z0itisg
1 + expf~s + is + z0itisg
:
where ~s is the intrinsic propensity to convert in state s, is is a time-invariant consumer
anity to convert and is is the consumer specic response to the time varying covariates.
Parameter Estimation
The likelihood for the observed data presented in Equation (4.9) can be written in terms
of the heterogenous probabilities mentioned here. The estimation can be performed using
a MCMC estimation approach similar to the method adopted by Netzer et al. (2008).
This model that incorporates consumer heterogeneity allows us to perform attribution for
a specic consumer. Some consumers might have an higher probability to convert even
without the inuence of online ads. The homogenous HMM would incorrectly ascribe credit
to the online ads when such consumers convert. However, the heterogenous HMM accounts
for a consumer's proclivity to convert and performs the attribution based on the underlying
consumer heterogeneity.
4.7. Conclusion
In this paper, we present a model that analyzes how consumers behave when they are ex-
posed to advertising from multiple online channels. The consumer behavior is captured
using a dynamic HMM which is modeled based on conversion funnel. A consumer moves
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through the states of the HMM in a stochastic manner when they are exposed to advertis-
ing activity. Conditional on being in a certain state, he can engage in a conversion activity
with a certain probability which is a function of his current state and other time varying
covariates. This model is estimated on campaign data from a car manufacturer. We show
that although display ads do not have an immediate impact on conversion, they have a sig-
nicant impact on the consumer behavior early on in the deliberation process. This result
is contrary to the popularly held belief that display ads do not work. They work but not
in the manner advertisers expect them to work. This nding has signicant implications
for the online advertising industry and it underscores the importance of better attribution
methodologies particularly for display networks and rms like Facebook that derive most of
their revenues from display advertising. We subsequently propose an attribution methodol-
ogy that attributes credit to the ads based on the marginal eect they have on a consumer's
conversion probability. This method not only takes into account the prior history of a
consumer before being exposed to an ad, it also considers the long-term future impact the
ad might have on the consumer's decision. We apply this methodology to the campaign
data and show that there are considerable dierences in the attribution performed by the
commonly used LTA and our methodology.
To our knowledge, this is the rst paper that analyzes the aect of online ads in a multi-
channel context. We hope that this paper can lead to a better understanding of consumer
behavior in a multi-channel context which might help researchers build better models in
the future. We also believe that this research can serve as a foundation for an integrative
approach to optimal budget allocation when an advertiser uses dierent channels for his
campaign.
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Appendix
Identication Assumption
For simplicity, let's assume that there are only two states where the initial membership
probabilities are denoted by  = f1; 2g. When a consumer sees an ad, he can follow one
of three possible paths - (1) He starts out in the rst state and transitions to the second
state, (2) he starts out from the rst state and stays in the same state after the ad event or
(3) starts out from the second state and stays in the same state. The likelihood of observing
an outcome y1 = (n1; c1)
0 after the rst ad is shown is given by
L = 1q11p
c1
1 (1  p1)1 c1P (N1 = n1jS1 = 1) + 1q12p1 c12 (1  p2)c2P (N1 = n1jS1 = 2)
+2q22p
1 c1
2 (1  p2)c2P (N1 = n1jS1 = 2)
As p1 = 0 in our model, the likelihood reduces to p
c1
2 (1  p2)c2P (N1 = n1jS1 = 2)(1q12 +
2q22). It can be shown that irrespective of what events follow afterward we can only
identify (1q12 + 2q22) in our model. Hence we impose the restriction that 2 = 0.
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